

MEMORANDUM


RM-5934-PR

MARCH 1969

AD 685129

THE FOREIGN MINISTRY  
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN CHINA'S  
"CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

Meivin Gurtov



PREPARED FOR:

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND

The RAND Corporation  
SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA

Approved by the  
CLEARINGHOUSE  
for Distribution in the  
International Community  
Washington, D.C. 20540

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE AND SALE; ITS DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.

92

**MEMORANDUM**

**RM-5934-PR**

**MARCH 1969**

**THE FOREIGN MINISTRY  
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN CHINA'S  
"CULTURAL REVOLUTION"**

**Melvin Gurtov**

This research is supported by the United States Air Force under Project RAND—Contract No. F11620-67-C-0015—monitored by the Directorate of Operational Requirements and Development Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development, Hq USAF. Views or conclusions contained in this study should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of the United States Air Force.

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT**

This document has been approved for public release and sale; its distribution is unlimited.

---

*The* **RAND** *Corporation*

1700 MAIN ST. • SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA • 90406

---

PREFACE

This study is part of ongoing research on Communist China at The RAND Corporation in two respects. First, it is part of the series under United States Air Force Project RAND dealing with China's politics, foreign policy, and military programs. Included in the series are studies of the "Cultural Revolution" -- its origin and development, the personal histories of some of its more prominent spokesmen, and the role of the military. The first such study -- W. F. Dorrill's Power, Policy, and Ideology in China's "Cultural Revolution," RM-5731-PR -- was published in August 1968.

The present study is also the initial product of the author's research on Communist China's policies toward Thailand, Burma, and Cambodia. The aim is to assess the motivations and goals of those policies, to elucidate Southeast Asian perceptions of Peking, and to draw implications for United States security and political interests in Asia.

SUMMARY

From the summer of 1966 until the autumn of 1967, Communist China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by Ch'en Yi came under verbal and physical attack by fanatical Red Guard organizations determined to carry the Cultural Revolution into the foreign affairs system. In that same period, China's relations with several countries rapidly worsened. These two developments, and their implications for China's foreign policy, are analyzed in this Memorandum.

Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi appears to have opposed any intrusion of the Cultural Revolution mass movement into his bureaucratic domain. Early in the contest, he revealed his opposition by defensive action, notably by sending "work teams" to certain institutions linked to the Foreign Ministry in order to protect long-time professionals and party officials against harassment by Red Guards. Ch'en's adamant resistance to a "revolution" inspired and directed by Mao evidently led the Cultural Revolution Group to sanction an "investigation" of the Foreign Minister, to demand a self-criticism from him, and to permit the establishment within the ministry of Red Guard "liaison stations" to oversee its work. The ebb and flow of the Cultural Revolution gave Ch'en Yi opportunities, however, to counteract by maintaining senior personnel in office and by seeking to mediate between "conservative" and "rebel" elements in the foreign affairs system.

The struggle over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs typified the larger conflict of the Cultural Revolution between entrenched bureaucrats and radicals authorized to "revolutionize" Chinese social and political institutions.

The radicals reached the peak of their power in August 1967 when, for roughly two weeks, they apparently gained control of the Foreign Ministry. Thereafter, they rapidly lost the regime's favor. Ch'en Yi emerged from the prolonged encounter with his position intact. The regime had consistently opposed the extremists' seizing power in the Foreign Ministry and overthrowing the Foreign Minister. But by supporting criticism of Ch'en and by intruding on the Ministry's work, the regime may have greatly weakened Ch'en's authority, prestige, and health.

Although Ch'en Yi functioned as Foreign Minister throughout the confrontation with the Red Guards, China's foreign relations yielded to the radical influence of the Cultural Revolution in several places. The Memorandum focuses on the two most dramatic instances of Chinese efforts to propagandize the Maoist cult abroad: Burma and Cambodia. In the former case, the timing and phasing of Peking's response to the anti-China riots in Burma beginning in June 1967 suggest that its open support of the Communist White Flag movement's aim to overthrow the Ne Win government was determined by the actions of local Chinese and Burmese officials. Peking seems to have been forced into a position where a diplomatic confrontation with Burma was preferable to accepting a humiliating compromise. The Cambodian situation, likewise precipitated by the propaganda activities of the Chinese Embassy and the New China News Agency, not only failed to result in violence as in Burma, but also reached a peak at a time when the Cultural Revolution had moved to a stage of consolidation and retreat. Resolution of the Sino-Cambodian crisis was hence more easily accomplished, probably due

also to the excellent personal relations between Chou En-lai and Sihanouk and to Peking's appreciation of the importance of Cambodian friendship to its foreign policy.

An assessment of the Cultural Revolution's impact on China's foreign affairs should consequently distinguish between foreign relations and foreign policy. The crude propaganda activities of Chinese missions abroad seeking to demonstrate their loyalty to Mao's "thoughts," though a by-product of the Cultural Revolution on the mainland, has doubtless undercut Peking's diplomatic posture. Countries that experienced Chinese cultural intervention are likely to keep up their guards in hosting Chinese missions. Moreover, the recall of nearly every Chinese ambassador and many lower ranking officers to Peking, beginning about December 1966, raises questions about the morale and effectiveness of the foreign service. Many, perhaps most, of the ambassadors may not return to their posts.

In terms of foreign policy, on the other hand, the Cultural Revolution is better judged as an aberrant episode rather than as a permanent new strand in Peking's policy orientation. The conflicts involving Ch'en Yi and the Foreign Ministry do not seem to have concerned substantive policy issues. Moreover, events since the fall of 1967 indicate a return of relative moderation in China's diplomacy, including efforts by Peking to ameliorate tensions with those countries that were directly affected by the overflow of the Cultural Revolution.

CONTENTS

PREFACE .....	iii
SUMMARY .....	v
Section	
I. INTRODUCTION .....	1
II. THE STRUGGLE IS JOINED .....	4
The Work Teams Controversy .....	4
Ch'en Yi and Foreign Affairs .....	10
III. THE FOREIGN MINISTER "CONFESSES," RECANTS, AND CONTINUES THE STRUGGLE .....	15
IV. JUNE-AUGUST: EXTREMISM TAKES COMMAND .....	33
The Content of the Attack Shifts .....	33
Foreign Relations in Mid-1967 .....	37
China and Burma .....	40
China and Cambodia .....	49
Relations with Other Countries .....	52
The Seizure of Power in the Foreign Ministry .....	53
V. THE RETURN OF MODERATION .....	62
Order Returns to the Foreign Ministry and Foreign Relations .....	62
The Last Act: Ch'en Yi's Self-Defense .....	69
VI. AN ASSESSMENT .....	76
The "Issues" in the Confrontation .....	76
Why Ch'en Yi Survived .....	79
A Revolution in Foreign Policy? ... ..	81

## I. INTRODUCTION

As other analysts have suggested in different ways,<sup>1</sup> the Cultural Revolution involves differences of emphasis among Chinese leaders over basic directional choices for the society at large: whether Maoist-style politics (or ideology) can continue to "take command" or must yield at least equal place to the practical problems and limitations involved in fixing priorities and setting goals; whether radical Maoism befits a China in transition or must be modified if China is to realize its historically based claim to great power status; or whether China must inevitably "change color" or can remain ideologically "pure red" even in the throes of modernization.

As these questions came to the surface in the summer of 1966, the foreign affairs bureaucracy, like the party apparatus as a whole, was suddenly forced to defend itself against the unleashed frenzy of young radicals out to "make revolution." Before a semblance of order was restored to the Foreign Ministry in the autumn of 1967, its operations had been disrupted, the Foreign Minister had been subjected to unprecedented abuse and humiliation, and China's image abroad had been badly tarnished. An effort to explain what happened to the Foreign Ministry and to derive the implications for China's foreign policy of events from

---

<sup>1</sup>See, for example, W. F. Dorrill, Power, Policy, and Ideology in China's "Cultural Revolution," The RAND Corporation, RM-5731-PR, August 1968; Philip Bridgham, 'Mao's "Cultural Revolution": Origin and Development,' The China Quarterly, No. 29, January-March 1967, pp. 1-35; H. G. Schwarz, "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," Orbis, Vol. X, No. 3, Fall 1966, pp. 803-821.



the summer of 1966 to the autumn of 1967 is the task of this Memorandum.

Focusing on the Foreign Ministry during the Cultural Revolution not only affords a rare look into the activities of an organ of Communist China's government; it also provides a unique opportunity to relate aspects of China's foreign relations to domestic events. However, analysis of the Foreign Ministry during 1966 and 1967, like analysis of the Cultural Revolution as a whole, can only hope to be partially satisfactory. There are two reasons for this: first, the available information, though suggestive, leaves as many questions unanswered as it may resolve; and second, the nature of the documentation demands considerable caution in interpretation. Both these points require additional comment.

In the first place, as intrinsically interesting and at times illuminating as the story of Foreign Minister and Vice-Premier Ch'en Yi's confrontation with the Red Guards may be, innumerable gaps remain to be filled. No definitive answer can be given, for instance, to the question whether any substantive issues were involved in the attacks on the Foreign Minister and the Ministry, although interpretations are offered throughout this study. The role of Mao Tse-tung also invites speculation: depending on the period under discussion, Mao seems either to have stepped in to protect his Foreign Minister, to have stood aside, or to have condoned limited attacks on him. We also know very little about Yao Teng-shan, the last Chinese chargé d'affaires in Djakarta, who returned to Peking in April 1967 and apparently took over the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs for two weeks in August. Finally, we can only guess what long-range effects the Cultural Revolution will have on ministry personnel and foreign service officers of the Chinese People's Republic (CPR).

On the second point, most of the materials cited in this study are articles from Red Guard newspapers representing factions having a vested interest in the struggle over the Foreign Ministry. Although replete with empty charges and steeped in the jargon of the Cultural Revolution, these articles, along with other materials used here, seem to possess a significant internal consistency in their reporting of details. Consequently, while it would be presumptuous to assume their complete accuracy, these materials do seem to provide important evidence which, if interpreted with care, should form an integral part of the Cultural Revolution's historical record.

## II. THE STRUGGLE IS JOINED

On August 8, 1966, at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was sanctified in a sixteen-point official decision.<sup>2</sup> For Mao Tse-tung, the decision made official what had already been clear for over three weeks, namely, that the Cultural Revolution would be under his leadership and would move sharply to the left. The decision also represented something of a political comeback for Mao, who for the two preceding months had been out of Peking and had apparently left direction of the Cultural Revolution to an ad hoc party committee under Liu Shao-ch'i and the CCP general secretary, Teng Hsiao-p'ing. It now seems fairly certain that Mao's dissatisfaction with the pace and style of the Cultural Revolution up to the Eleventh Plenum, as well as the impetus for the sweeping purge of party ranks which began with Liu and Teng, stemmed from the performance of work teams (kung-tso-tui) dispatched by the Liu-Teng committee in the chairman's absence.<sup>3</sup>

### THE WORK TEAMS CONTROVERSY

Ch'en Yi apparently used the work teams to defend organizational units loyal to him in the foreign affairs system. Initially, they were probably sent out by Liu

---

<sup>2</sup>The decision is published in Peking Review, No. 33, August 12, 1966, pp. 6-11.

<sup>3</sup>The following account of the work teams relies on the analysis of Dorrill, op. cit., pp. 123-136.

and Teng to modulate the anti-party fervor that had begun to sweep over university campuses as the first wave of the Cultural Revolution struck in the late spring and early summer of 1966. To preserve party authority, some work teams evidently employed armed force to quell disturbances by radical students and other self-proclaimed leftists. After Mao returned to Peking, he ordered the work teams recalled on July 24.


By that time, Ch'en Yi had already revealed his hand. He had opposed the posting and publication of the first wall poster at Peking University in June.<sup>4</sup> Soon thereafter, almost certainly with the knowledge and consent of Liu and Teng, Ch'en had also sought to head off the extremist elements who appeared to be threatening to extend the radical movement to certain institutes linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see the organizational chart on page 6).<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup>Talk by Ch'en Yi on February 16, 1967, in Ch'en Yi yen-lun hsüan (Selected Speeches of Ch'en Yi), Tz'u-lien ch'u-pan-she, Hong Kong, 1967. (That this is an anti-Ch'en collection is made abundantly clear on the cover, which consists of a photograph of the Foreign Minister asleep on a rostrum during an official ceremony.) See also "Bombard Ch'en Yi, Liberate Foreign Affairs Circles" (hereafter cited as "Bombard Ch'en Yi"), Hung-ch'i (Red Flag), April 4, 1967, p. 2 (written by the Red Flag First Company of the Peking Aeronautical Institute).

<sup>5</sup>In his self-criticism of January 24, 1967, Ch'en said: "At the inception of the Great Cultural Revolution movement, I did not comprehend this Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. At that time the impact of the mass movement was overwhelming, and I did not have the proper ideological preparation for it. . . . I was apprehensive about the impact of the mass movement, fearing that it might jeopardize order and affect foreign affairs work." The self-criticism was first published in Hung-wei-pao (Red Guard Newspaper), February 8, 1967; translated in "Ch'en Yi's Self-Criticism," Chinese Law and Government, Vol. I, No. 1, Spring 1968, p. 34.

THE STRUCTURE OF COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS SYSTEM (1966-1967)



SOURCE: Adapted from chart 2 in Department of the Army, Communist China: A Strategic Survey, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., February 1966.

Ch'en, by his own admission, dispatched "some fifteen work teams or groups. Eight of these were sent by the Foreign Affairs General Office and the Foreign Affairs Political Department to the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, and relevant bureaus and schools. Seven were sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to units and schools under its jurisdiction," including the Peking Foreign Language Institute.<sup>6</sup>

The work teams, led by high-ranking subordinates of Ch'en Yi (including a few vice-ministers),<sup>7</sup> reportedly collaborated with various party committees and organizations to prevent the radicals from establishing themselves in any of the Foreign Ministry's allied agencies.<sup>8</sup> In the process, several key cadres in the foreign affairs system loyal to Ch'en were afforded protection from the mobs, which sometimes demanded that the cadres be removed from office. Among those whom Red Guard publications charged were maintained in office by Ch'en despite their "counterrevolutionary" activities were: Li Ch'ang, vice-chairman of the Commission for Cultural Relations

---

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 52-53. The article "Bombard Ch'en Yi," cited in ft. 4, recounts Ch'en's protection of the Institute's party committee, as well as of other organ.

<sup>7</sup>Lo Kuei-po and Liu Hsin-ch'üan reportedly headed two work teams. "Bombard Ch'en Yi," op. cit.

<sup>8</sup>The work teams' tactics are most fully treated in "Criticize Ch'en Yi's Reactionary Policy of 'Attack a Large Part, Protect a Handful,'" Wai-shih hung-ch'i (Foreign Affairs Red Flag), May 8, 1967 (written by the Revolutionary Rebel Committee of the Central Committee, Foreign Affairs Political Department).

with Foreign Countries and secretary of its party organization; Fang Fang, head of the party committee of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission; Nan Han-ch'en, chairman of the Committee for the Promotion of International Trade, who was later to commit suicide; Liu Hsin-ch'üan, a vice-minister of foreign affairs; and Lo Chün, director of the Foreign Language Publications and Distribution Bureau.<sup>9</sup>

After the Eleventh Plenum, pressure seems to have increased on the Foreign Ministry and associated agencies to accept a certain number of so-called "revolutionary committees" into their midst. After Mao recalled the work teams, extremist elements should have anticipated no further opposition. From his "confession" (which Ch'en was later to claim was obtained under duress) and from Red Guard materials, however, it appears that Ch'en continued to resist the "revolutionary left." In some cases, he refused to back extremist attacks on the work teams; in others, he evidently sought to maintain the work teams in their respective offices by mediating between them and their opposite numbers.<sup>10</sup> Ch'en clearly found the situation intolerable, as his description of the impact of the "rebels" on the Foreign Language Institute (FLI) indicates:

The Foreign Language Institute is divided into two parts. Originally there were 21 units, but after a week there were over 50, and after another week, over 70. Over 4 thousand people in over 70 units makes over 70 cliques. The oceans are

---

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> "Ch'en Yi's Self-Criticism," op. cit., p. 55.

vast to behold: this is truly one hundred flowers blooming and one hundred schools of thought contending.<sup>11</sup>

According to one Red Guard source, when Mao discovered that the work teams were still in the FLI, he sent Premier Chou En-lai to investigate conditions. Chou directed a reorganization of the Institute and a criticism of the work teams, but Ch'en sought to stage a comeback by dispatching Wang P'ing, deputy director of the Ministry's Political Department (i.e., the number two political commissar), to reconcile the "conservatives" and rebels.<sup>12</sup>

Ch'en's choice of directly confronting the radicals and, it would seem, of defying Mao's wishes, reportedly led, in November, to his being "investigated," presumably by Red Guard groups.<sup>13</sup> In speeches of November 13 and 29, Ch'en seems to have thrown down the gauntlet before the Red Guards by attacking them for their undisciplined behavior; thereafter, he is quoted as having demanded that each government organ should remain responsible for solving its own problems. He also allegedly implied that he, as foreign minister, was above criticism or interference

---

<sup>11</sup>Ch'en Yi yen-lun hsüan, op. cit., p. 21.

<sup>12</sup>Statement of the Red Guard organization in the FLI, Wai-shih-hung-ch'i, May 8, 1967, translated in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), Translations on Communist China: Political and Sociological, No. 42,070, August 3, 1967, pp. 13-16.

<sup>13</sup>Chu Pu (pseud.), "An Analysis of Ch'en Yi's Confession, 'I Am the Foreign Minister'" (hereafter cited as "Ch'en Yi's Confession"), Fei-ch'ing yen-chiu (Studies on Chinese Communism), Vol. II, No. 2, February 29, 1968, p. 33.



by Red Guards.<sup>14</sup> Ch'en's own version is self-incriminating, but consistent with his conduct during these first months of the Cultural Revolution. He said in January 1967: "my talks [in November] at the various units . . . were fraught with serious errors in striking at the leftists and in repressing the revolutionary masses."<sup>15</sup>

#### CH'EN YI AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

During the latter half of 1966, Ch'en Yi's involvement with the Red Guards did not keep him from performing his functions as foreign minister and vice-premier. Between July and December, either individually or with Premier Chou, he welcomed, hosted, and attended banquets for visiting foreign dignitaries, spoke on foreign policy (e.g., a speech on July 10 castigating the United States for assertedly bombing Hanoi and Haiphong), attended such important celebrations as National Day (October 1), and participated in mass meetings welcoming Red Guard groups evicted from the Soviet Union and Indonesia (November 5 and December 29).<sup>16</sup>

Significantly, there is no evidence to support the view that Red Guard hostility to Ch'en and the Ministry at this time concerned foreign policy issues. To the contrary, contrasting the official policy line with Ch'en's one major commentary on foreign affairs -- a

---

<sup>14</sup>"Bombard Ch'en Yi," op. cit.

<sup>15</sup>"Ch'en Yi's Self-Criticism," op. cit., p. 56.

<sup>16</sup>Fei-ch'ing yen-chiu, op. cit., Vol. I, No. 6, June 30, 1967, pp. 105-106.

speech of October 5, 1966 not disseminated abroad by Peking news media -- reveals absolute consistency of viewpoint.

Against the background of the abortive coup attempt by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) on September 30, 1965, the breakdown of preparations for holding a "second Bandung" conference of Afro-Asian nations in Algiers on November 5, and intensified disagreement with the Soviet Union over Vietnam, Chinese analyses of the international situation during 1966 sought to demonstrate that while "setbacks" to the world revolutionary movement had occurred, these were to be expected, would not be lasting, and in fact had a certain salutary effect. One example of this kind of rationalization of events appeared in Shih-chieh chih-shih (World Knowledge) under the pseudonym of Szu Mu.<sup>17</sup> The article acknowledged that "The development of the international situation, filled with contradictions and conflict, gives rise to zigzags and reversals. In this or that area or country, the people's revolutionary movement meets with temporary difficulties and setbacks."

The article continued:

But, in the world at large, the force of people's revolution surpasses the reactionary force of imperialism, the people's revolutionary flood prevents the counterrevolutionary stream from

---

<sup>17</sup>"The Advance of the Revolutionary Movement of the World's People is the Main Current of the Present Situation," Shih-chieh chih-shih, Nos. 2-3, February 10, 1966, pp. 6-10. This publication, generally considered an authoritative foreign policy organ, turned completely to publishing documents on the Cultural Revolution beginning in May 1966. In June, the periodical ceased publication altogether.

rushing forward. The people's revolutionary struggle is developing in an even deeper direction; the general situation is very good, it is even more advantageous to the world's people and not advantageous to U.S. imperialism . . . In this accelerated process of advance of world history, in this time of sharpened struggle between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary strength, various types of different political forces have unavoidably split severely or are splitting, have reorganized or are reorganizing. . . .

Even where setbacks had occurred, the article concluded, these represented "only partial phenomena" and were possibly even beneficial in exposing revisionist imperialist collusion and in steeling oppressed peoples for even greater struggles.

This formulation remained intact after the events of the summer of 1967, when China's relations with neighboring and distant countries suffered at the hands of radicals in several Chinese embassies. What is important to point out here is that on October 5, 1966, when Ch'en Yi spoke before the Military Institute in Peking,<sup>18</sup> he did not depart one iota from the official line rendered by "Szu Mu." Ch'en said those who had expressed doubts about Mao's theses regarding imperialism had "failed to see the forest for the trees." Ch'en continued:

According to the Chairman's directive analyzing the [international] situation, as a consequence of the expansion of the anti-imperialist struggle by the world's people, the international

---

<sup>18</sup>Text of Ch'en's address is in Ch'ing-hua University Defend-the-East Corps, Shou-chang yen-lun chi (Collection of Speeches of the Leaders), Vol. IV, November 1966, Peking, pp. 12-16. (The collection is marked "For Internal Distribution Only.")

situation at the time is one of big upheaval, big splitting, big reorganization, and deepening struggle: the three bigs, the one deep (san-ta i-shen). As the three-bigs and one-deep have developed, especially since this May, because our Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has appeared on the world stage, it has been of far-reaching international influence. The Vietnam war situation is very good, the anti-imperialist struggle of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples has new developments, the international communist movement has developed a step further, with a new anti-imperialism, anti-revisionism forming. Naturally, the situation has not been all smooth sailing; it must develop along a zig-zag road, [but] the mainstream of the situation is even more to the advantage of the people, to the advantage of the world revolution, and even more disadvantageous to imperialism and the reactionary cliques and modern revisionists of all countries. This is the estimation of the general situation. . . .

Ch'en also cited specific "evidence" to prove his point that the situation was generally well in hand. He said he could not understand the fear struck in some people by the Cultural Revolution, for in many countries, foreigners had welcomed Mao's thoughts and were praising it to the skies -- in Iraq, Pakistan, India, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and elsewhere. Of interest in view of subsequent events, Ch'en also mentioned Burma and Cambodia, saying that "Burmese independence has China's support" and that "A Cambodian suddenly appeared at our reception, said the Chinese people are the number one friend and [that he] felt pride and wants to return after the Cultural Revolution." In short, while Ch'en Yi was on the one hand resisting as best he could any intrusion of Red Guard organizations into the foreign affairs system,

-14-

on the other he was adhering faithfully to the Mao line on foreign policy. And this was to remain his constant position during the ordeal to come.

III. THE FOREIGN MINISTER "CONFESSES," RECANTS,  
AND CONTINUES THE STRUGGLE

In retrospect, Ch'en Yi seems to have been fighting a losing battle in refusing to give ground before the Red Guards while they had the approval of Mao Tse-tung. Although Ch'en had managed to keep Red Guard groups from organizing effectively within the Foreign Ministry or the other foreign affairs-related agencies and bureaus, his chief weapon for counterattacking, the work teams, had been taken from him. Furthermore, beginning in December 1966, additional ground was cut from under Ch'en when the regime began recalling ambassadors and senior embassy staff members back to Peking, probably in order to "re-educate" some and to purge others.<sup>19</sup> By late spring of 1967, only Ambassador Huang Hua in Cairo remained at his post; other embassies were left in the control of chargés

---

<sup>19</sup> Conceivably, the recall of ambassadors was also linked to a Mao instruction of September 9, 1966. According to a later Red Guard account (Wai-shih feng-le: (Foreign Affairs Wind and Thunder), June 8, 1967, published by the Red Flag Revolutionary Rebel Regiment, Peking Foreign Language Institute, Capital Red Guard Congress), Mao's instruction had been issued in response to reports that Chinese embassies were havens for bourgeois living. "Let us have a revolutionization," the instruction read; "otherwise, it would be dangerous." Perhaps Mao believed that high living by ranking embassy officials flew in the face of the Cultural Revolution's proclaimed anti-capitalist emphasis, and hence that certain embassy personnel would have to be re-schooled in, if not permanently reduced to, simpler living. See JPRS, No. 42,359, August 28, 1967, pp. 15-19.

d'affaires. The recall of ambassadors was to have important consequences several months later, for it probably facilitated the manipulation of several embassies by fanatic followers of Mao.

As had been the case the preceding summer, when ultra-left attacks on leading cadres in the Foreign Ministry coincided with nationwide demonstrations against provincial party, government, university, industrial, and other centers of power, the events that were to lead to Ch'en Yi's "confession" in January 1967 also occurred in the midst of widespread turmoil. In mid-December, Red Guards had been given the "green light" to take over several government organs (including the Supreme People's Court) by Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing, deputy head of the Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group. This endorsement from the top was extended later in the month to encompass Red Guard "power seizures" of labor organizations. The final plug was removed from the dike during what came to be known as the January Revolution, "the Maoist drive to seize power in the party and government apparatus on a nation-wide scale," which began in Shanghai.<sup>20</sup> The unexpected chaos that accompanied the January Revolution, which was to compel Mao to resort to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to restore order, so intensified the pressure on the Foreign Ministry that the Foreign Minister had to yield to demands for self-criticism in order to ensure his political survival.

---

<sup>20</sup>Philip Bridgham, 'Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power,' The China Quarterly, No. 34, April-June 1968, p. 8.

Ch'en Yi's defenders in the Foreign Ministry would later charge that around the first of January 1967 a "plot" developed under the direction of Wang Li, a member of the Cultural Revolution Group, deputy editor of the authoritative ideological journal Red Flag, and subsequently a prime antagonist of Ch'en's in the contest involving Yao Teng-shan. Allegedly, the plot aimed at overthrowing Ch'en "and several other vice premiers" in defiance of Chou En-lai,<sup>21</sup> who then and thereafter seemed to be protecting Ch'en from being forced out of office. The allegation, though probably exaggerated, is consistent with the fact that, during January, a number of Red Guard organizations, in their drive to "seize power," wildly attacked the Cultural Revolution's spokesmen, including Chou.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup>I-yüeh feng-pao (January Storm), Canton, May 1968, as translated and appended by the editors of Chinese Communist Affairs: Facts and Features (Taipei), Vol. I, No. 22, August 21, 1968, pp. 22-23. Additional comments on the document written in defense of Ch'en Yi may be found on pp. 63ff.

<sup>22</sup>For example, Ch'en Po-ta, head of the Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group, in a speech of January 24, 1967, to a meeting of representatives of Peking University, deplored factionalism in revolutionary groups. Ch'en said that whereas the "spearhead" of the struggle was supposed to have been directed at Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, "some people have nevertheless directed the spearhead of their attack at the revolutionaries, at the Cultural Revolution Group of the Party Central Committee, at Premier Chou, Comrades K'ang Sheng, Chiang Ch'ing, Wang Li, Kuang Feng, and Ch'i Pen-yü." Huo-ch'e-t'ou (Locomotive), No. 7, February 1967, in American Consulate-General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), No. 3898, March 14, 1967, p. 4. See also the comments of Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power," op. cit., pp. 8-11.



Whether or not a plot actually took form, then, the main point is that sharpened assaults on Ch'en Yi and the Foreign Ministry took place coincidentally with, and certainly under the influence of, a growing breakdown of order in the Cultural Revolution as a whole.

On January 18 the anti-Ch'en forces were for the first time able to gain a foothold in the Foreign Ministry itself. A "Ministry of Foreign Affairs Revolutionary Rebel Liaison Station" (wai-chiao-pu ke-ming tsao-fan lien-lo-chan) was set up on that date and began "to lead revolution and to inspect work."<sup>23</sup> A Red Guard report on events at that time implied that the "liaison station" was necessary to block a developing "anarchical" situation in which "conservative" (i.e., pro-Ch'en) cadres previously ousted were being permitted to return to their posts. Thus, the report continued, whereas the Cultural Revolution had decreed that, "based on practical requirements," new organizational forms should replace old ones, "After the seizure of power, a reverse wind appeared in the form of demanding restoration of the original system. This was [an attempt] to bury the achievements of the Cultural Revolution."<sup>24</sup> Ch'en Yi had evidently again balked at the notion of having a permanent Red Guard presence in his ministry.

---

<sup>23</sup>Chu Pu, op. cit., p. 36. See also "Bombard Ch'en Yi," op. cit.

<sup>24</sup>"Bombard Ch'en Yi," op. cit. See also Hung-wei-pao (Red Guard Newspaper), Peking, No. 24, May 23, 1967, p. 3, an article by the Red Flag Struggle Corps of the Foreign Language Institute, in which Ch'en is called "an irredeemable monarchist" for having sought to protect himself and his followers from reform by the masses since 1963.

The Red Guards, being equally stubborn and still having the authority of Mao's nationwide call to "struggle" behind them, now issued their investigation report, which consisted of Ch'en's self-criticism of January 24 delivered before a mass rally of 10,000 reportedly presided over by Premier Chou. According to the report, entitled "My Investigation" (Wo ti chien-ch'a),<sup>25</sup> Ch'en was guilty of seven major "crimes," four of which related to his dispatch of work teams before and after the Eleventh Plenum. Moreover, he had failed to lift high the red flag of Mao's thoughts, did not go among and learn from the masses, and displayed a bureaucratic work attitude; he had committed major mistakes in 1961 and 1962 by delivering speeches that stressed expertise over ideology (redness); finally, he needed to be a better student of Mao, to emulate Lin Piao, and to study the good points of comrades in the Cultural Revolution Group.

Ch'en's confession, with its outpouring of self-condemnation, seems temporarily to have won over most of the Red Guards. In publishing the confession on February 8, the editor of Hung-wei-pao (Red Guard Newspaper) called it "sincere" and "thorough" and considered Ch'en's attitude worthy of "emulation."

Events have shown that although Comrade Ch'en Yi [continued use of the term "comrade" is significant] committed a great many mistakes, he never engaged in double-cross and was able to examine and rectify his o. . . . Thus,

---

<sup>25</sup> See Chu Pu, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

he is still a good comrade in the proletarian headquarters. We must resolutely support and sustain him.<sup>26</sup>

But "the ink was not dry on his self-criticism," according to Ch'en's opponents, "when he put back in their jobs and positions very questionable people, as well as Party people in power following the capitalist road, in several academies in Foreign Systems."<sup>27</sup> Apparently having had no intention of surrendering to fanatic Red Guards, who had already begun physically disrupting the Foreign Ministry,<sup>28</sup> Ch'en once again counterattacked. He declared the rebels incapable of any positive service beyond arbitrarily labeling ministry cadres "revisionists,"<sup>29</sup> and he

---

<sup>26</sup>"Ch'en Yi's Self-Criticism," op. cit., pp. 51-52.

<sup>27</sup>"Criticize Ch'en Yi's Reactionary Policy . . . ," Wai-shih hung-ch'i, in JPRS, No. 42,070, pp. 13-16.

<sup>28</sup>Speaking to Red Guards at the airport on February 12, Ch'en said: "The facts prove that what I said last year was not wrong, not all wrong. Look at things now, we must still do things my way. If things had all along been done my way, we wouldn't have come to this state. At present look at what has happened to the ministry: no order, no organization, foreign affairs secrets have been taken away." Hung-wei chan-pao (Red Guard Combat Newspaper), April 8, 1967, and Hung-ch'i, April 4, 1967, cited in Ch'en Yi yen-lun hsuan, p. 20, and in China Topics, op. cit., Document 3.

<sup>29</sup>Chu Pu, op. cit., p. 36, citing the newspapers Hung-wei chan-pao, April 8, 1967, and Hung-ch'i, April 4. In a talk of February 8, reported by these newspapers, Ch'en said: "They [the Red Guards] wanted to put all the department heads and vice-ministers off in a corner; they don't have the right. Even Chairman Mao needs to have people to talk to." Ch'en also reportedly said: "The greatest weakness of the rebel group is that it speaks only of the weaknesses of others. Are you all so in line with the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung? They [the Ministry's cadres] have 90, 92, 99 percent of the responsibility;

accused the rebel liaison station of having "made an error of line and direction." Undoubtedly at Ch'en's direction a number of evidently ultra-leftist functionaries in the Foreign Ministry were removed from or challenged in their posts; articles were written by the "conservatives" attacking those in the rebel group;<sup>30</sup> and, in the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC), extremists were compelled to accept a pro-Ch'en official, Wu Chi-sheng, as a compromise leader in a makeshift coalition.<sup>31</sup>

Ch'en Yi's statement to a Red Guard group at the Peking airport on February 12, "My investigation was forced," therefore merely underscored his already clear determination to take the offensive. Conceivably on the

---

you should also have a little. . . ." (Quoted from the same newspapers in Chu Pu, p. 41.)

<sup>30</sup>"Bombard Ch'en Yi," op. cit.

<sup>31</sup>There were apparently two groups fighting for control of the Overseas Commission: the Ch'en-backed "United Power-Seizure Committee," and the rebel-backed revolutionary left organizations led by the "Tungfanghung (East-is-Red) Commune of Returned Overseas Chinese." Wu Chi-sheng, head of the First Department of the OCAC and a member of its party committee, teamed with one of the Commission's vice-chairmen, Lin Hsiu-teh, to carry out the Ch'en Yi-Liao Ch'eng-chih line of buying time for the outnumbered conservatives by merging the two hostile groups. As shall be seen shortly, the radicals, considering that any merger was really meant to destroy "the struggle for seizure of power in the OCAC," became increasingly boisterous during March and April, directing demonstrations against Ch'en, Liao, and the OCAC party committee under Fang Fang. See Ke-ming ch'iao-pao (Revolutionary Overseas Chinese Affairs Bulletin), April 9, 1967, in SCMP, No. 3939, pp. 9-11; the article was written by the Red Guided Missile Fighting Team of "Returned Overseas Chinese Tungfanghung Commune in the Capital."

basis of renewed assurances of support from Mao and Chou, Ch'en told Red Guards they should "go to Vietnam" if they wanted to make revolution. He asked why they still were not united behind him when Mao and Chou already were.<sup>32</sup>

In a later reported talk with Red Guards, Ch'en assailed critics of Ho Lung, the besieged former PLA marshal and vice-premier, warning that attacks on old cadres "are giving us a black eye." The point has been reached, he declared, where few people can be believed.

Whom do you believe? [he asked]. If you believe the chairman, Lin Piao, the premier, Ch'en Po-ta, Chiang Ch'ing, and K'ang Sheng [adviser to the Cultural Revolution Group], then you've only got six people. I am indebted for your magnanimity. You've thrown in five vice-premiers, only 11 people. So a great party only has a few clean people? I don't want to be among the clean ones; take me out to the crowd!<sup>33</sup>

Obviously warming up to his role, Ch'en boldly went on to declare that "Comrade [Liu] Shao-ch'i speaks correctly. . . . Comrade Shao-ch'i . . . is my teacher." And he ended his unsparing critique by denouncing the Red Guards for saying that the Liu-Teng foreign policy line is "the line of revisionism. No, this is Chairman Mao's line. You're too crazy, you don't know what's going on."<sup>34</sup> Ch'en Yi had evidently reached the limits of his tolerance for

---

<sup>32</sup> Ch'en Yi yen-lun hsüan, op. cit., pp. 14, 15.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 16, 19. See also the quotations in "What Poison this Ch'en Yi Is," Hung-wei chan-pao, April 13, 1967, p. 4, written by the Capital Congress of Red Representatives, People's University Three-Red Seize Ch'en Yi Regiment.

what could only have struck him as outrageous conduct by juvenile self-styled leftists who were demanding his head after years of faithful service to the party.

Ch'en's firmness before the Red Guard onslaught should have led to an early showdown, but the confrontation was postponed, in effect, for two months. As before, the struggle in the Foreign Ministry was shaped by the overall direction of the Cultural Revolution decided by Mao and the Cultural Revolution Group. On January 23 (before Ch'en's outburst), the PLA had been instructed to "actively support the revolutionary leftist faction,"<sup>35</sup> which in fact meant that the army was to stem the tide of anarchy that unrestrained radicalism had produced. The military quickly made its impact felt in "three-way alliances," which generally gave proportionally greater representation to the PLA and experienced "revolutionary cadres" than to Red Guards. Synchronous with this comeback by formerly discarded party cadres, the Red Guards were ordered to reform their lines (by merging into a single Red Guard congress), to disband "revolutionary liaison" groups and return to school, and to undergo rectification with PLA supervision.<sup>36</sup> The Red Guards' forced retreat, lasting through February, gave the Foreign Ministry a much-needed breathing spell.

---

<sup>35</sup> Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP, the Military Affairs Committee of the Central Committee, and the Cultural Revolution Small Group, in Hsing-huo liaoyuan (A Single Spark May Start a Prairie Fire), Peking, January 27, 1967.

<sup>36</sup> Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power," op. cit., pp. 11-14.

The parallel development of the Red Guards' role in the Cultural Revolution and in the Foreign Ministry entered its next stage in March 1967, when the young radicals seized the opportunity afforded by PLA shortcomings in its new political task to charge that not only some but a great many old-line cadres were being reinstated at the expense of the revolutionary left.<sup>37</sup> Apparently, these "false power seizures" had already occurred in the Foreign Ministry. Beginning in March and extending into May, the Red Guards were given a second life as the Cultural Revolution again moved into a phase of frenzied attack against "capitalist roaders" supposedly out to regain lost power.

The limited available information suggests that during March the focal point of renewed confrontation between extremist factions and Ch'en Yi was the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission. On March 28 a Preparatory Group for Struggle Against Counter-Revolutionary Revisionist Fang Fang, the party committee chairman, was formed.<sup>38</sup> This group's charter probably was to undermine the alliance that Ch'en Yi and Liao Ch'eng-chih, chairman of the OCAC, had been intent upon creating.<sup>39</sup> On April 4, the General Command sponsored a mass rally against Ch'en and Liao, accusing them of having "stubbornly executed the bourgeois reactionary line in the overseas Chinese affairs system and [of having] attempted to strangle the Great Cultural Revolution in the overseas Chinese affairs system."<sup>40</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., pp. 15-16.

<sup>38</sup> Ke-ming ch'iao-pao, in SCMP, No. 3939, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>39</sup> See ibid., p. 21 and ft. 31.

<sup>40</sup> Ke-ming ch'iao-pao, in SCMP, No. 3939, p. 7.

The rally against this latest manifestation of Ch'en's "anti-left" attitude spread to the Foreign Ministry on April 8 when about 100 Red Guards of the Foreign Language Institute reportedly staged a demonstration.<sup>41</sup> On the same day, and more significantly, a Criticize Ch'en Yi Liaison Station (P'i-p'an Ch'en Yi lien-lo-chan) was set up,<sup>42</sup> probably to replace the earlier Revolutionary Rebel Liaison Station which, by the February 3 Central Committee directive, should have been abolished along with all other liaison stations in government organs.

With the installation of a new liaison station in the Ministry, the stage was set for a third round of "struggle," one with far more serious consequences for Ch'en's authority than the previous two. Apparently trying to forestall Ch'en Yi's removal while simultaneously placating the Red Guard organizations, Ch'en Po-ta put the Central Committee's stamp of approval on criticism of Ch'en in a speech on April 19, but barred the Foreign Minister's overthrow. Ch'en Po-ta instructed "that Ch'en Yi should be listened to, watched, and helped."<sup>43</sup> In view of the importance of his work, Red Guards were told to moderate their attacks; meanwhile, Ch'en Yi would have to go before the masses, and in future Chou En-lai would supervise the Ministry's work.<sup>44</sup> At that point, according to Ch'en's loyal

---

<sup>41</sup> See the chronology of events in China Topics, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. and Chu Pu, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>43</sup> I-yüeh feng-pao, op. cit., p. 26.

<sup>44</sup> China Topics, op. cit., pp. 1-2, and Document 6.



followers in the Ministry, the policy of the Maoist regime was "one-third criticism and two-thirds guarantee" of Ch'en Yi.<sup>45</sup>

Yet, "less than 24 hours" after Ch'en Po-ta's directive, a statement demanding Ch'en Yi's overthrow was assertedly published by "the former nucleus of the liaison office of the Foreign Ministry, dominated by a group of bad leaders. . . ."<sup>46</sup> On May 10 the attack was broadened to include two more vice-ministers of foreign affairs, Ch P'eng-fei and Ch'iao Kuan-hua.<sup>47</sup> And on May 11, ten Red Guard organizations staged a demonstration against Ch'en Yi in Peking.<sup>48</sup> These acts, although taken, as Ch'en's defenders subsequently charged,<sup>49</sup> in apparent defiance of the express wishes of the Central Committee, were probably inspired by Ch'en Yi's refusal to conform to Ch'en Po-ta's instructions that the Foreign Minister should conduct self-criticism. Like Ch'en Yi, the Red Guards had apparently lost all patience with the opposition.

---

<sup>45</sup> I-yüeh feng-pao, op. cit., p. 22.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>48</sup> Reported in P'i-Ch'en chan-pao (Criticize Ch'en Combat Newspaper), Peking, No. 1, May 28, 1967, p. 1, published by the Criticize Ch'en Yi Liaison Station.

<sup>49</sup> Ch'en's defenders asserted: "The more the central authorities expressed their unwillingness to overthrow Ch'en Yi, the louder their [the Red Guards'] clamor and the higher the pitch of their language. . . . They disobeyed the orders of the Central Committee and oppressed the masses." Quoted in I-yüeh feng-pao, op. cit., p. 26.

That this was the case became evident on May 12 when Chou En-lai met with the ultraleftist liaison station of the Foreign Ministry and "representatives of over ten other revolutionary organizations" involved in foreign affairs work. Noting that Ch'en Yi had "refused Ch'en Po-ta's directive of April 17 to go before the masses," the Premier reportedly gave his support to having the Foreign Minister give a full account of his crimes. He urged the Red Guards to continue their correct criticism by "drawing up cases" (ch'uang-tsao an-chien) and preparing "the unity of big, medium, and small [criticism] meetings" against Ch'en. Finally, Chou made clear that this criticism should extend through July. According to the Red Guard report of the meeting,

The Premier also concretely laid out the plan for criticizing Ch'en Yi, saying that criticism 'must be done for the three months of May, June, and July.' The premier decided that Ch'en Yi should first listen to criticism at the Foreign Ministry and afterwards go again to the Foreign Language Institute, the Foreign Affairs Institute, and the Second Foreign Language Institute. The Premier further said he would personally chair the meeting to criticize Ch'en.<sup>50</sup>

The Red Guards apparently took Chou's words as the signal for intensified attacks on Ch'en Yi and the Ministry. The following day, May 13, saw the first of a series of tumultuous incidents on the ministry grounds as

---

<sup>50</sup> Chou's meeting with the Red Guards is reported in full in P'i-Ch'en chan-pao, May 28, 1967. Similar information may be found in a Red Guard poster of May 12 signed by revolutionary rebels of the Foreign Language Institute: see China Topics, op. cit., Document 5/c.

hundreds of rampaging rebels belonging to the Red Flag Detachment of the FLI (the organization in control of the liaison station) occupied that part of the ministry building which houses confidential documents. For six hours, according to various wall posters of May 14, the Red Guards completely disrupted normal operations, beating up officials who stood in their way, breaking open files and copying down documents (it was here that the oft-quoted remark of one rebel -- "What's so terrific about secrets? To hell with them" -- was supposedly made), and barring free entry and departure. According to one poster, the Red Flag detachment took action mainly because Chou had failed to include it among the ten organizations assigned to criticize Ch'en Yi.<sup>51</sup> In view of the extremists' tendency to become more rabid whenever confronted with countervailing power, this explanation must be given some weight.

In fact, Chou En-lai does not seem to have departed in the least from his and the Central Committee's previous position that the Red Guards could oversee the Ministry's work and criticize Ch'en Yi, but could neither take over operation of the ministry nor "overthrow" its head. A Red Guard poster of May 17 reporting a four-hour meeting of rebel organizations with the Premier brought out Chou's dual line. The rebels are said to have made three demands in the course of their conversation: first, that Ch'en should go before the masses; second, that Vice-Minister

---

<sup>51</sup>China Topics, op. cit., Document 5/e. Invasion of the Foreign Ministry on May 13 was also reported by Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, June 1, 1967.

Chi P'eng-fei should be removed as a bourgeois element; third, that neither Ch'en and Chi nor Vice-Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua should be allowed to continue in the ministry. Chou reportedly responded by pointedly indicating he would not favor the rebels' dragging out ranking members of the Foreign Ministry. He said that while he had consistently supported the rebels' demands, the matter of Ch'en Yi was different and required a decision by the Central Committee, not only as to his going before the masses, but also as to his removal. Chou cautioned the youths against pressuring him and against attributing to him critical views of Ch'en which were not in fact his own. He cut off the lengthy give-and-take -- which, according to the poster, was at times marked by heated indignation on the part of the impatient rebels -- by suggesting that they organize several criticize-Ch'en meetings which he would attend.<sup>52</sup>

From developments after this meeting, it seems fairly certain that several Red Guard units had collectively determined to defy Chou's (and the Central Committee's) distinction between attack and overthrow. On May 16 Japanese correspondents reported a clash outside the Foreign Ministry between pro- and anti-Ch'en Yi groups. During the remainder of the month, moreover, criticisms of Chou as well as Ch'en appeared, prompting members of the Cultural Revolution Group to tell Red Guard representatives on May 27 that the Premier could not be criticized, that not only he but Ch'en Po-ta had shielded the

---

<sup>52</sup>China Topics, op. cit., Document 5/d.

Foreign Minister, and that the office of foreign minister was too important to be given over to just anyone.<sup>53</sup> The Red Guards' response was a violent one. On May 29 about 300 of them representing one of two rebel groups within the OCAC raided the Ministry, forcibly removed classified material from safes, and demanded that Liao Ch'eng-chih be handed over to them for criticism. The Red Guard posters containing this information indicated that Ch'en Po-ta had to intervene to demand the return of the classified materials.<sup>54</sup>

Although it has been suggested that the Red Guards were probably motivated to oppose the Central Committee principally out of sheer loss of patience over the dilatory tactics of Chou and Ch'en Po-ta, it may also have

---

<sup>53</sup> Asahi Shimbun, June 1, 1967, based on a mimeographed wall poster put up on May 31. Criticism of Chou was reported in one Red Guard newspaper to have been the work of the "Independent Battalion of the Red Guard 616th Regiment in the Peking Foreign Language Institute." Wai-shih hung-ch'i, No. 5, May 26, 1967, p. 3, article by "Observer."

<sup>54</sup> From wall posters and slogans dated May 14 outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; see China Topics, op. cit., Document 5/f. According to Ch'en's defenders, writing in I-yüeh feng-pao, op. cit., p. 26, the Red Guard invasions of May 13 and 29 were in defiance of the express orders of the Central Committee "that power of diplomacy should not be seized and top secrets should not be captured, administration and personnel records should not be used, and the political department established by Chairman Mao should not be destroyed. But a handful of class enemies and extreme left elements openly disobeyed the directives, closed the office of the party committee in the Ministry and destroyed the political department, usurped the Bureau of Top Secrets, impeded the archive system and disclosed many top secrets. Their actions greatly damaged the power of diplomacy and personnel."

been their acquisition of a leader -- Yao Teng-shan -- that gave them the added audacity to fight their way into the Foreign Ministry. Yao Teng-shan, until late April 1967, had been the ranking CPR official in Indonesia as chargé d'affaires ad interim. On April 28, he and Hsü Jen, the consul general in Djakarta, were declared personae non gratae by the Indonesian Government and ordered to leave the country. This action was hardly surprising in view of the rapid deterioration of Sino-Indonesian relations following the unsuccessful PKI coup attempt of September 30, 1965. When Yao and Hsü returned to Peking on April 30, they were declared "red diplomat fighters" and given heroes' welcomes. Virtually every leading member of the government (except Mao), including the entire hierarchy of the Foreign Ministry, was reportedly present to greet them at the airport.<sup>55</sup>

Yao's precise activities after his return are for the most part shrouded in mystery. But to judge from his briefly successful attempt in August to replace Ch'en Yi as de facto foreign minister (see below), it is likely that Yao had become deeply involved in Red Guard intrigues upon his return. We know, for instance, that Yao and Hsü Jen were present during Chou En-lai's meeting with Red Guard organizations on May 12, where they were again referred to as "red diplomat fighters" ("hung wai chan-shih").<sup>56</sup>

---

<sup>55</sup> Their arrival was reported by NCNA (Peking), April 30, 1967, in SCMP, No. 3932, May 4, 1967, pp. 31-33.

<sup>56</sup> P'i-ch'en chan-pao, May 28, 1967.

Subsequently, on May 19, Yao and Hsü were featured speakers at a rally of 10,000 persons in Peking to denounce the Indonesian Government.<sup>57</sup> Other reports of his activities from June through July, when placed beside the new direction Red Guard criticisms began taking after his return (devoting considerable attention to the overseas Chinese in Indonesia), provide at least an interesting circumstantial case for the hypothesis that Yao Teng-shan in effect gave the Red Guard anti-Ch'en forces the firm backing they needed to oppose the Central Committee and to carry the Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry to new heights.

---

<sup>57</sup> NCNA (Peking) broadcast of May 19, 1967.

#### IV. JUNE-AUGUST: EXTREMISM TAKES COMMAND

Whether or not the return of Yao Teng-shan was a crucial factor in the planning of the ultraleft, from May until roughly the end of August, the Foreign Ministry was hard pressed to maintain a semblance of equilibrium in the face of Red Guard incursions. Once again, the strength of the extremists varied in accordance with the overall strength of the left in the Cultural Revolution; as Mao leaned to one side or the other in search of appropriate leadership for implementing the Revolution, the fortunes of the Foreign Ministry's "conservatives" and radicals seem to have been correspondingly affected. In July and August, when Mao evidently responded to the Wuhan Incident (see below) by again backing the use of extremist measures, the die was cast in favor of an all-out assault on the Ministry, which culminated in the temporary elimination of relatively moderate influence in the conduct of foreign relations.

#### THE CONTENT OF THE ATTACK SHIFTS

Coincident with the return of Yao Teng-shan from Indonesia, it appears that the organizations of the extreme left shifted the substance of their verbal attack. Whereas previously they had concentrated on Ch'en Yi's lack of enthusiasm for promoting a "revolution" in the Foreign Ministry, they now sought to undermine him by playing up specific "issues," such as Ch'en's alleged failure to have supported the overseas Chinese in Indonesia at the time of the Gestapu Incident.



As we have seen, Liao Ch'eng-chih's Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission had for several months been a particular target of Red Guard organizations. Until about June 1967, however, the extremist groups had been intent upon "seizing power" on the basis that the Commission, like other organs linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was dominated by "counterrevolutionary" cadres more interested in preserving their jobs than in participating actively in the Cultural Revolution. Beginning in June, the ultraleft took a new tack, arguing that the conservatism of these cadres explained why the Foreign Ministry had stood on the sidelines while overseas Chinese were being systematically denied their rights. To cite one example, a Red Guard newspaper charged that Liao Ch'eng-chih, conforming to the revisionist, capitulationist international line of Liu Shao-ch'i, made certain that the overseas Chinese did not interfere with efforts to curry favor with local governments: "He [Liao] asked the overseas Chinese 'to mind their own business,' 'to stick to their own posts,' and 'not to criticize the internal affairs of the local governments.'" Consequently, Chinese abroad were not permitted to "make revolution" in accordance with the thoughts of Mao. Thus, the charge ran, in South Vietnam in 1956, Chinese were forced to become naturalized Vietnamese citizens; and in Indonesia, restrictions were placed on the number of Chinese schools (1957), Chinese were deported following the dual nationality agreement (1959), and Chinese were slaughtered in the wake of the abortive PKI coup attempt (1965).<sup>58</sup> The timing of

---

<sup>58</sup> P'i-Liao chan'pao (Criticize Liao Combat Newspaper), Peking, June 18, 1967, written by the "Long Cord in

these accusations, coming after the return of Yao Teng-shan and while returned Chinese students from Indonesia were prominent in the opposition movement within the OCAC,<sup>59</sup> raises the question of whether they were based on fact or fancy. Whichever is the case, the purpose was clearly to increase support for the extremists' position that Ch'en Yi and cadres protected by him were reactionaries who had to be overthrown.

At this time the ultraleft again raised the matter of the conduct of embassy personnel abroad. The charges here were that members of the diplomatic corps had become ideologically and materially corrupted by their "bourgeois" style of living abroad; ambassadors considered themselves above criticism and seldom went "to the masses"; embassies had become "independent kingdoms" (a charge similar to that made against certain province party officials), "'one-doctrine' halls, or 'family-type gangster inns' that

---

Hand" Combat Team and the "Rebel to the End" Combat Team of the Red Banner Corps of the OCAC. Translated in JPRS, Communist China Digest, No. 42,977, October 16, 1967, pp. 74-77.

<sup>59</sup>Upon returning to China in December 1966, forty-one students were dubbed "the heroic fighting collective" and were reported (in late April 1967) to have "settled down on the overseas Chinese farm in Ninghua hsien, Fukien Province." (NCNA (Peking), April 29, 1967, in SCMP, No. 3931, May 3, 1967, p. 27.) Actually, these students not only participated in several mass rallies against Indonesia and in welcomes for groups of Chinese arriving from Indonesia; they also seem to have been at the forefront of the Tungfanghung Commune which had been leading the struggle against the conservative United Power-Seizure Committee in the OCAC.

trample under foot the party principle of democratic centralism."<sup>60</sup> Ch'en Yi was responsible for these developments, according to the Red Guard indictment. Ch'en had "distorted and depreciated" Mao's instructions by confining orders on embassy reform to matters of living style and dress. In fact, the article maintained, Ch'en should have seen that the whole spirit of the Cultural Revolution was carried abroad; as matters stood, Chinese embassy officials were ill-disposed to using big-character posters and students abroad were forbidden to take part in the "revolutionization" of embassies. The ultraleft viewpoint, as reflected in this newspaper article, called for implementation of Mao's instructions and concluded: "The revolutionary students who have studied abroad must unite with the proletarian revolutionaries in the foreign service."<sup>61</sup>

In view of Ch'en Yi's behavior throughout the Cultural Revolution, in particular his consistent determination to prevent Red Guard power and influence from seeping into his own "independent kingdom," the charge that he only half-heartedly implemented Mao's directive on reform may well be correct. Ch'en was in fact quoted by Red Guards as having said some months previously: "These thoughts

---

<sup>60</sup>"Thoroughly Smash the Privileged Stratum in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Wai-shih hung-ch'i, June 14, 1967, written by the Red Guards Service Center of Returned Students of the Capital Red Guard Congress in JPRS, Communist China Digest, No. 42,997, October 16, 1967, pp. 112-117.

<sup>61</sup>Wai-shih feng-lei, June 8, 1967, in JPRS, op. cit.

of Mao Tse-tung are really a Chinese product; we mustn't take them abroad."<sup>62</sup> Whether or not those were his actual words, his actions would seem to indicate that his intent was to maintain a relatively moderate course in foreign affairs, which in particular meant that embassies were not to become centers for "making [cultural] revolution" in foreign countries.

#### FOREIGN RELATIONS IN MID-1967

The Cultural Revolution had for some time so pre-occupied the Peking leadership that foreign affairs received substantially less attention than in the immediate pre-Revolution period. The extremely limited coverage of overseas news in the mass media, the noticeable decline in the number of arrivals of foreign dignitaries, and the virtual cutoff of departures of Chinese delegations on visits abroad all lend themselves to this conclusion.

To the extent that foreign relations were conducted, however, Ch'en Yi continued to play a principal role in them. His presence at receptions, banquets, and other official functions was reported throughout the period he was under attack until late August, when ill health apparently forced him to the sidelines for over a month. But his influence over the implementation of foreign policy was probably very limited. One indirect indication is Ch'en's reiteration in early July to a visiting member of Japan's Liberal-Democratic Party of the traditional themes of CPR foreign policy (noninterference, peaceful

---

<sup>62</sup>"What Poison This Ch'en Yi Is," op. cit.

coexistence, and so on) and his assurance that China's diplomatic position would not change as a consequence of the Cultural Revolution.<sup>63</sup> By that time, however, China's relations with Burma had already been grievously harmed, and within a few more months the traditional themes would not be very credible to China's Asian neighbors and Ch'en Yi himself would no longer be in a position to promote them.

It is important to point out, however, that prior to the period of maximum ultraleft influence on domestic politics and foreign relations (roughly from late June to the end of August), not only was Ch'en Yi Foreign Minister in fact as well as name, but also the CPR retained good relations with its "friendly" neighbors, some of whom would later have to deal with the Cultural Revolution on their home territories. These included Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ceylon, Nepal, Cambodia, and Burma.<sup>64</sup> A few illustrations drawn from New China News Agency reports should suffice.

---

<sup>63</sup>Yomiuri Shimbun, Tokyo, July 8, 1967. The interview was also attended by Liao Ch'eng-chih in his capacity as president of the China-Japan Friendship Association and chief Chinese negotiator of trade agreements with the Japanese.

<sup>64</sup>At this time and subsequently into 1968, the CPR continued to support revolutionary movements in Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Laos, and Vietnam, was very hostile to the governments of Indonesia and India (trying to point out, in the latter case, how New Delhi's economic misfortunes were creating appropriate conditions for people's war in West Bengal and other areas, and occasionally criticized the pro-"imperialist" policies of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Japan. The most excitable of Chinese foreign policy statements in the spring and summer of 1967 were reserved for Hong Kong, where forceful British security measures had for some months been prompting Peking protests. On June 9, in fact, the official French news

- o Friendly relations with Rawalpindi were indicated by a banquet for the visiting Pakistani minister of defense (May 26).
- o A reception was given on May 27 to celebrate the 49th anniversary of Afghan independence, highlighted by a speech on Vietnam by Ch'en Yi.
- o A high-ranking member of the Ceylon Communist Party visited Peking. Although praising the Cultural Revolution in a speech before "revolutionary rebels" on May 20, he refrained from speaking poorly of his own government.
- o The CPR made a grant of 20,000 tons of rice to Nepal on March 14. On April 27, a reception was held to mark the seventh anniversary of the signing of the China-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty.
- o A statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed "that the Chinese government fully respects the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia in her present borders," a response to a request by Prince Sihanouk of all governments.<sup>65</sup>
- o The NCNA heralded the impending completion of four CPR aid projects as evidence of the traditional friendship of the Chinese and Burmese peoples (February 12). A reception was attended by Chinese officials in Peking to mark the twenty-second anniversary of the founding

---

agency, Agence France-Presse, reported from its Peking correspondent that Red Guards had besieged the British mission that evening following an afternoon incident in which about one hundred pro-Maoist non-Chinese had stormed the mission and destroyed official property.

<sup>65</sup> Sources, in order of presentation, are: NCNA (Peking) broadcast of May 26, 1967; NCNA (Peking), May 27, 1967, in SCMP, No. 3950, June 1, 1967, pp. 30-31; NCNA (Peking), May 26, 1967, in SCMP, No. 3950, pp. 36-39; NCNA (Kathmandu), March 16, 1967, in SCMP, No. 3902, March 20, 1967, p. 26, and NCNA (Peking), April 27, 1967, in SCMP, No. 3930, May 26, 1967, pp. 27-28; NCNA (Peking), June 13, 1967, in SCMP, No. 3961, June 16, 1967, pp. 28-29.

of the Burmese armed forces (March 27). The usual expressions of paukphaw (kinsmen) relations were exchanged on May 10 in Peking on the fifteenth anniversary of the China-Burma Friendship Association.<sup>66</sup>

Below the surface, however, there were already signs of strain in China's relations with Burma and Cambodia. The disruption that ensued in those relations, as well as in Peking's relations with Nepal, Ceylon, and several European and African countries, merits additional detail in order to point up the difficulties of foreign policy-making in Peking at a time of domestic upheaval. Burma and Cambodia, as the two most serious cases of dispute with Communist China, are given more lengthy treatment.

#### China and Burma

Public expressions of cordiality in Sino-Burmese relations overshadowed the subdued, highly tentative support Peking had been giving the Communist Party of Burma (CPB-White Flags) since November 1963, when peace negotiations between the CPB and Rangoon broke down. As can now be documented,<sup>67</sup> the failure of the Government of the Union

---

<sup>66</sup>NCNA (Rangoon), February 12, 1967, in SCMP, No. 3882, February 17, 1967, p. 19; NCNA (Peking), March 27, 1967, in SCMP, No. 3908, March 30, 1967, p. 24; and NCNA (Peking), May 10, 1967, in SCMP, No. 3938, May 12, 1967, p. 31.

<sup>67</sup>On developments in the CPB between 1963 and 1966, see J. H. Badgley, "The Communist Parties of Burma," in R. A. Scalapino, ed., The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1965; quotations from the Guardian and Vanguard Daily (both of Rangoon) in Asian Notes, No. 115, May 20, 1968 and No. 117, June 17, 1968; Rangoon domestic

of Burma (GUB) and the communist insurgents to reach agreement intensified the split in the White Flags between those favoring protracted armed struggle and those more amenable to a reconciliation with the government. The hardliners, led by Thakin Than Tun, chairman of the politburo of the CPB Central Committee, were supported by a group of Burmese communists who had returned from extended residence and training in Peking to take part in the negotiations. In conformity with China's by then openly hostile attitude toward Moscow, the Peking returnees, in collaboration with Than Tun and two other politburo members, evidently pressed for a showdown with the "softer" (that is, allegedly pro-Moscow) party leaders. At a CPB Central Committee meeting during the latter half of 1964, the so-called Peking clique decided to purge the party of "revisionists"; but the clique evidently did not feel strong enough to start with its opponents in the leadership group. Then, in early 1966, the Peking clique made its move; it launched a "life forum movement" to attract young recruits and (apparently in the summer of 1966 coincident with the CCP Eleventh Plenum) instituted its own cultural revolution.

By the early summer of 1967, just prior to the outbreak of trouble between Peking and Rangoon, the pro-Peking faction of the CPB had made some headway in its renewed drive to coalesce and at the same time refurbish its ranks. Internally, the two key opponents of Than Tun, long-time politburo members Ba Tin (Goshal) and Yebaw Htay, were

---

service broadcast of August 18, 1967 (reporting a news conference with a former party official who defected to the government); Botataung (Rangoon), May 19, 1968.



executed on June 18 near the party's central camp in the Pegu region.<sup>68</sup> Their removal paved the way for a top-to-bottom purge of the party organization that would later have serious effects on its cohesion. Meanwhile, the Maoist-like stress on revitalizing the party with young blood continued, reportedly involving additional recruitment drives and the establishment of "red guard" groups in various parts of the countryside. Militarily, moreover, the White Flags became much more active, perhaps in response to the Burmese Army's offensive. The White Flags launched a number of disturbingly large raids in the populous, rice-rich central delta; and they attracted the leftist faction of the Karen insurgents, among others, into a National Democratic United Front (NDUF) as part of an apparently successful campaign to gain the support of every major dissident movement in the delta.

These events took place, it must be emphasized, at a time when Peking-Rangoon relations were still outwardly, though by no means effusively, friendly. The Chinese had as yet made no move to depart from the policy of respect for Burmese neutralism as represented in the military government of Ne Win. Certain aspects of Burmese foreign policy, such as Ne Win's trip to the United States in September 1966, may not have pleased Peking, for they seemed to indicate a very gradual evolution toward more balance in Rangoon's external affairs and, thereby, a

---

<sup>68</sup>Rangoon domestic service broadcast of April 18, 1968. In view of the personalist nature of Burmese politics, and especially of the factionalism it has produced in the CPB, the purge should probably be regarded as an opportunity for Than Tun to settle old scores no less than as an effort to cleanse the party of "Soviet revisionism."

subtle departure from the sheltered neutralism Burma had been practicing virtually since independence.<sup>69</sup> But, as far as can be ascertained, Peking gave no hint of displeasure despite the reformation of the White Flags into a solidly pro-Peking party with seemingly new military potential.

The CPR's subsequent estrangement from the GUB and its encouragement of the White Flags to overthrow the Ne Win regime may therefore best be explained by examining the circumstances and timing. The departure of the Chinese ambassador and most of his staff from Rangoon in March 1967, followed by the return of a chargé d'affaires

---

<sup>69</sup> Badgley has traced Burma's turn away from isolationism in foreign policy back to December 1965, when Senator Mike Mansfield, the first ranking American to visit Rangoon since the 1962 coup, carried to Ne Win the suggestion of a trip to the United States. Among the other signs of new policy flexibility were Ne Win's visits to Pakistan and India (1966); the conclusion of a boundary treaty with India (March 10, 1967) that "went beyond the territory that China claimed as its own, where the three boundaries meet"; demarcation of the Burma-East Pakistan border (May 19 7) at a time when Peking was rumored to be providing low-level support to disaffected elements of the Nagas; the dispatch of Burmese trade missions to Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand (June 1967); and the considerably larger number of students sent to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe than to China. (Badgley, "Burma's China Crisis: The Choices Ahead," Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 11, November 1967, pp. 755-756.) To this list should be added the fact that Liu Shao-ch'i's visit to Burma in April 1966 was the only one by a ranking CPR official between August 1965 and the incidents of mid-1967. (Ne Win's last trip to Peking occurred during July and August 1965.) Liu's trip, incidentally, which also included Pakistan and Afghanistan, was hailed at the time as a major diplomatic triumph. See the editorial in Jen-min jih-pao, April 21, 1966, p. 1.

and (reportedly) several Red Guards, inaugurated a series of events that were to be repeated with little variation in other countries: the transformation of the Chinese Embassy and the New China News Agency into centers for the propagation of Mao's thoughts; the distribution or attempted distribution of Mao badges and other symbols of the Cultural Revolution's personality cult; and the ensuing clash with local government authorities over Chinese insistence on the justifiability of distributing Maoist literature and badges without interference. When some Chinese students, encouraged by local CPR officials, defied the Burmese Government's order banning the wearing of Mao badges in class, the first of many anti-Chinese riots occurred on June 22. In succeeding days, the riots became more intense and led to violence against Chinese residents, the closing of Chinese schools, and invasion of the CPR embassy, the Rangoon offices of the NCNA, and other official buildings.<sup>70</sup> On June 28, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented the first government protest demanding an end to anti-Chinese activities, compensation for damages to life and property, and punishment of the offenders. The GUB was charged with having "instigated" and "connived" in the incidents, and was warned that it "must bear full responsibility for all the serious consequences arising therefrom."<sup>71</sup>

---

<sup>70</sup>For a fuller account of events in Rangoon at this time, see F. N. Trager, "Sino-Burmese Relations: The End of the Pauk Phaw Era," Orbis, Vol. XI, No. 4, Winter 1966, pp. 1040-1049.

<sup>71</sup>NCNA (Peking), June 28, 1967, in SCMP, No. 3971, June 30, 1967, pp. 28-29. The protest was handed to

Refusing to be intimidated by this thinly-veiled threat, the GUB sought only to contain rather than prevent violence against local and official Chinese. Anti-China demonstrations spread to other major towns and villages, but most importantly, on June 28, a member of the Chinese aid team was slain in Rangoon. The Chinese Government thereupon issued a second, more formal protest on June 29 against this and preceding incidents, again with a warning of unspecified consequences should the GUB persist in its course of action.<sup>72</sup> This time the GUB replied in a memorandum of the same date delivered by a member of the Foreign Office to the Chinese chargé. Ignoring the bulk of China's demands, the GUB informed the Chinese Government that it deemed the anti-Burma demonstrations then taking place in Peking an "unfortunate development" that "will adversely affect the sincere efforts of the Burmese Government to restore a normal situation in Burma and to maintain and preserve the friendly relations between the two countries." The Chinese Government was asked to step in to stop the demonstrations. Peking rejected the memorandum.<sup>73</sup>

What is of especial significance for our analysis is that during this first week of escalating verbal exchange,

---

Burmese Ambassador Sinwa Nawng at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Deputy Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung. On the same day, the CPR chargé in Rangoon, Hsiao Ming, also made an official protest that included similar demands. SCMP, No. 3972, July 1, 1967, pp. 37-38.

<sup>72</sup>NCNA (Peking) international service broadcast of June 29, 1967; Peking Review, No. 28, July 7, 1967, p. 17.

<sup>73</sup>Excerpts from the memorandum and a report of China's reply were broadcast by NCNA (Peking) on July 1, 1967.

Peking held back from exploiting events in Rangoon by denouncing the Burmese Government and throwing its support to the CPB. Evidently, Mao Tse-tung and his chief lieutenants, though perhaps taken aback by the forcefulness of Ne Win's response to the Chinese Embassy's actions, decided or were persuaded not to move too hastily toward a break with Rangoon. The CPR government statement of June 29 may have been the most crucial test of the GUB's intentions. Only when the GUB's reply evidenced no willingness to meet Chinese demands -- and this at a time when a Chinese technician had been killed and the controlled Rangoon press was publishing unprecedentedly critical anti-China articles -- might Mao have decided to push the confrontation further.

On June 30, a Jen-min jih-pao editorial revealed a qualitative change in China's position. The GUB was attacked as "reactionary," "fascist," and "counterrevolutionary"; and, for the first time,<sup>74</sup> Peking cited the CPB's important revolutionary role:

Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance, and the more ruthless the oppression, the stronger the resistance. In the last five years and more, the contradictions between the broad masses of the Burmese people and the Burmese ruling clique have grown increasingly acute. Strikes of workers and students have taken place one after another. After overcoming

---

<sup>74</sup>By contrast, when NCNA announced on June 23 that the CPB Central Committee had sent the CCP Central Committee a message of congratulations on the explosion of China's first hydrogen bomb (June 18), the message made no allusion to events in Burma and no derogatory remarks about the GUB.

numerous difficulties, the revolutionary armed struggle led by the Burmese Communist Party is now developing successfully. In the last year in particular, the people's revolutionary armed forces have grown much stronger; they have expanded and consolidated their base areas and strengthened their ties with the broad masses. Burma's national-democratic revolution has taken a new and important step forward.<sup>75</sup>

Further illuminating the fact of a delayed shift in Peking is that the Chinese waited until July 1 before broadcasting (and thus giving support to) a sharp, uncompromising attack on the GUB by the White Flags. In this statement, the National Democratic United Front was mentioned for the first time, and the claim was made that "the nationalities of Burma are becoming more and more friendly and united under the leadership of the CPB."<sup>76</sup> From that point on, Sino-Burmese relations were, to all intents, suspended.<sup>77</sup>

Taken together with developments on the China mainland, it appears that Peking's break with Rangoon over anti-Chinese incidents in the latter city was shaped by the actions of Chinese and Burmese officials on the spot. While it might be argued that Peking was simply looking for the appropriate pretext to denounce the GUB and align publicly with the revitalized White Flags, the weight of the evidence favors a more complex interpretation. The CPB had indeed

---

<sup>75</sup>As broadcast by NCNA (Peking), June 30, 1967.

<sup>76</sup>Statement of the CPB Central Committee of June 28, broadcast by NCNA (Peking), July 1, 1967.

<sup>77</sup>In the CPR government statement of June 29, Peking announced it had decided not to send its ambassador back to Rangoon. The Burmese ambassador to Peking was not withdrawn until September. However, the embassies of both countries continued to function throughout the crisis.

purged its ranks of "anti-Peking" elements and claimed to have developed a united front against the GUB; yet Peking still chose to remain aloof from the CPB until June 30, eight days after the riots had begun. The phasing and timing of Peking's responses suggest that the Maoist leadership finally supported the CPB not because of any new finding of strength in the Burmese communist movement, but because the situation in Burma had developed to the point where Peking had to choose between backing down (by retracting or shelving its demands) or supporting its officials and overseas Chinese under attack. And Peking's choice seems in turn to have been compelled by the actions of those ultraleftists in the CPR embassy and other agencies who considered themselves duty-bound not merely to fulfill the static function of representing Chinese interests abroad, but also to be active publicists of the thoughts and works of Mao Tse-tung. These zealots, when challenged in this latter role by the GUB, responded as had their compeers in Peking -- by taking up the challenge and rejecting either retreat or compromise -- and thus set in motion a chain reaction of increasingly intransigent statements and actions in Rangoon and Peking. It should also not be omitted that Peking's choice of the second alternative was all the more ensured by the extremist tide which, by late June, had once more engulfed the Cultural Revolution.<sup>78</sup> Conceivably, the return of extremism further

---

<sup>78</sup>In general, factionalism within the Red Guard movement and often violent confrontations between leftist groups claiming Mao's support were the dominant themes of the Cultural Revolution throughout the summer of 1967. This situation was spotlighted when two members of the

influenced Mao and the more radical members of the Central Committee not to let the crisis subside without backing China's warnings of "consequences" with deeds.

#### China and Cambodia

At roughly the same time that extremist influence was beginning to be felt in the official Chinese missions to Burma, the Cambodian Government was experiencing similar problems. Despite his public support of a number of key Chinese foreign policies, Prince Sihanouk could not contain his private distaste for the Cultural Revolution. As early as March 1967, the Prince criticized it as "an erroneous policy" which, with its Red Guards, "has won contempt and not admiration" for the CPR.<sup>79</sup> The contrast between statements for international consumption of respect and admiration for China, and unofficial critical evaluation for domestic consumption of Chinese policies, is characteristic of Sihanouk's style in conducting his neutralist foreign policy. But to judge from the response of Chinese officials in Cambodia, Sihanouk's comments and subsequent actions touched an open nerve.

---

Cultural Revolution Group (Hsieh Fu-chih and Wang Li), dispatched to Wuhan late in July to resolve a dispute between two such groups, so outraged local military commanders by their decision that they were seized and held as political hostages. The Wuhan Incident was apparently precisely the kind of ammunition the more radical members of the Cultural Revolution Group needed to buttress their contention that only armed action and violence could root out party and military leaders opposed to Mao. See Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power," op. cit., pp. 24-25.

<sup>79</sup> Comments before a special congress of the National Assembly on March 12, 1967; Phnom Penh domestic service broadcast, same date.



Trouble between Cambodians and local Chinese came into the open during May. Sihanouk had become very disturbed over the dangerous situation that had arisen in a few provinces where rebels (called "Khmer Viet Minh" or "Khmer reds") were engaging in armed violence, assertedly under orders from radical left politicians in Phnom Penh. After forming a new cabinet on May 2, the Prince spoke out against communist subversion of schools, universities, and Chinese-run newspapers. Articles in the Khmer press joined in, calling attention to the dangers posed by Chinese manipulation of the economy through black market operations and by the continued teaching of Maoist ideology in Chinese schools. Adding to the drama, two Cambodian newspapers persisted in writing unfavorable accounts of developments in China despite demands from the CPR embassy to cease.<sup>80</sup> Other newspapers went further, implying that China was directly involved in subversion in Cambodia. This speculation, which Sihanouk publicly refused to engage in, was based on the well-known fact that the Chinese Embassy was a strong financial backer of the Khmer-Chinese Friendship Association, the local Chinese schools, and the Chinese newspapers.

This entangled situation of small-scale insurgency, political conflict, and Chinese Embassy interference in

---

<sup>80</sup> On May 30, Phnom Penh radio broadcast a Chinese Embassy open letter that had appeared in the leftist newspaper La Nouvelle Dépêche. The letter claimed "the right of every Chinese" to venerate Mao, refuted charges that Embassy-sponsored publications about developments on the mainland were subversive, and said that "the real enemy and the real subverters" in Cambodia were "a handful of Chiang Kai-shek partisans" working on behalf of U.S. imperialism.

Local affairs had several adverse consequences for the (assertedly) pro-Chinese leftists in Cambodia. The government cracked down on the Chinese school system and imposed controls over their curricula. Black-marketing among local Chinese was dealt with much more firmly than in the past, and at least two Chinese were deported to the mainland. Lastly, a combination of carrot-and-stick measures in the rebellious provinces was apparently successful, for on June 17 the government announced the end of the communist uprising.

Peking may have taken a jaundiced view of these and other developments in Cambodia. Resistance to the Chinese Embassy's efforts to propagandize the Cultural Revolution, and the Cambodian Government's suppression of pro-left dissidence, were given prominent attention in issues of the Ts'an-k'ao hsiao-hsi (Reference News), the special newsletter circulated among Chinese party and other officials. Also spotlighted was Sihanouk's laudatory message of thanks to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko for Russia's having become the first communist nation to recognize and respect Cambodia's existing borders.<sup>81</sup> That decision must have embarrassed and annoyed Peking (as well as Hanoi), for it compelled the Chinese to do likewise. Yet Sihanouk received only one sign of possible Chinese disturbance over his actions; when he sent a congratulatory message to Peking following China's first explosion of a hydrogen device, he did not receive the customary reply. Not until

---

<sup>81</sup> Further detail on the contents of the Ts'an-k'ao hsiao-hsi during this period is available in The Washington Post, August 28, 1967, article by Stanley Karnow.

August, however, when Cambodia's foreign minister, Prince Norodom Phurissara, visited Peking, did the two governments directly deal with the question of China's official attitude toward propagating the Cultural Revolution in Phnom Penh.

#### Relations with Other Countries

Although China's relations with Burma and Cambodia were the most dramatic, CPR officials elsewhere who were seeking to demonstrate the commitment to the Cultural Revolution ran into the same kinds of obstacles as in Rangoon and Phnom Penh. In Kenya, the Chinese chargé d'affaires was ousted after the embassy had tried to disseminate Mao books and badges.<sup>82</sup> In Nepal, restrictions by the government against the wearing of badges and the sale of Mao's "Quotations" during early July were accompanied by raids on the Nepal-China Friendship Association. The CPR charged collusion among Nepal, India, and the United States,<sup>83</sup> and by early August a number of embassy personnel had been withdrawn. Finally, difficulties with Ceylon began when customs authorities in Colombo intercepted a package of previously banned Mao badges, allegedly by boarding a Chinese vessel. In its note of protest on August 15, the CPR embassy charged that this act was "a continuation and development of the Ceylon Government's repeated connivance in anti-China activities over more than two years."<sup>84</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup>Peking Review, No. 28, July 7, 1967, pp. 37-38.

<sup>83</sup>NCNA (Peking) broadcasts of July 8, 9, and 22, 1967.

<sup>84</sup>NCNA (Peking) broadcast of August 19, 1967. Later, Peking protested when Ceylon invited Taiwan's participation

Incidents such as these, which also occurred in Sweden, Switzerland, and Algeria, were clearly distinct from, and yet can only be fully appreciated against the background of the chaos then sweeping the mainland -- a chaos which, during August, culminated in the temporary triumph of the ultraleft in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

#### THE SEIZURE OF POWER IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

The signal given the revolutionary left by leading figures in the Cultural Revolution Group to redouble their efforts to "seize power" was undoubtedly welcomed by the opponents of Ch'en Yi. For the first time, so far as is known, two men previously identified as possible leaders of the anti-Ch'en forces -- Wang Li and Yao Teng-shan -- made their open bid for power. Replacing the slogan "Overthrow Liu [Shao-ch'i], Teng [Hsiao-p'ing], and T'ao [Chu, the purged head of the CCP Propaganda Department]" with "Overthrow Liu, Teng, and Ch'en," Wang Li apparently used his position in the Cultural Revolution Group to advantage, with Yao serving as his advance man.<sup>85</sup> According to accusations leveled against Wang much later, he became actively involved in the "Overthrow Ch'en" movement after returning to Peking as one of the heroes of the Wuhan Incident:

---

in the Asian Trainers Conference for female guides and in the Third Asian Boxing Championships, both held in Colombo. NCNA (Peking) broadcast of August 23, 1967.

<sup>85</sup> i-yüeh feng-pao, May 1968, cited in Chinese Communist Affairs: Facts and Features, op. cit., p. 23.

Following his return from Wuhan, he became so power-hungry as to consider that "the time is ripe" and that "only those who have power have prestige." Therefore, he spread the rumor that "Chairman Mao and the Premier want me to have a say in the Foreign Ministry." He laid his black hand on the Foreign Ministry and through the ambitious man Yao [Teng-shan], he made public his notorious "August 7 speech" in a vain attempt to break and split the proletarian headquarters headed by Chairman Mao from the extreme left, so as to seize power from it.<sup>86</sup>

What was described as an "upheaval" in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began with this "August 7 speech" by Wang Li, which seems to have incited a final surge of the ultraleft to wrest power from ranking members of the Ministry. For fourteen days, it is said, Yao Teng-shan functioned as foreign minister. Before his brief reign ended, apparently coincident with the sacking of the British chancery in Peking (see below), he had "wrested power from the Foreign Ministry's Party Center" and had "sent cables to the [Chinese] embassies in foreign countries without the permission of Chairman Mao and Premier Chou."<sup>87</sup>

Chou seems to have gone to considerable lengths to prevent this power seizure from turning into a complete disruption of China's foreign relations. Having been appointed the principal overseer of the Ministry in April,

---

<sup>86</sup>Yeh-chan-pao (Field Combat) March 1968, in *ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 17, June 12, 1968, p. 23. According to the editors of Chinese Communist Affairs, the August 7 speech contained an attack by Wang on the military commanders of the Nanking and Foochow military regions, linking them to the alleged anti-party elements Ho Lung and Hsu Hsiang-chien. See *ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 3, November 29, 1967, p. 24.

<sup>87</sup>Hung-wei-pao, October 18, 1967.

Chou was evidently faced with a challenge to his own as well as to Ch'en Yi's authority when Yao Teng-shan made his move. Such, at least, was the situation Chou described to two "revolutionary committees" which visited him in early September asking advice on how they might set themselves up. Chou cited the circumstances in the Foreign Ministry during the previous month as a good example of how not to go about revolutionizing government offices. He said the Ministry had undergone a "seizure of power" in August, but that rebels in the Ministry had come into conflict with the Central Committee when they went "beyond supervision" to actually making decisions. Chou is quoted by a Red Guard newspaper as follows:

I supported the Foreign Ministry in the Central Committee [in August]. When the Foreign Ministry went to the brink, I held a meeting. . . . I was directly responsible for running the Foreign Ministry and as a result they seized power from me. They sent telegrams directly to foreign embassies. As a result they were sent back. Yao Teng-shan went everywhere making reports and creating trouble. He went to the Ministry of Foreign Trade once. His report to the Ministry of Foreign Trade was incorrect, and was very provocative. I criticized him on the spot. The Central Committee put forward the slogan of "Down with Liu, Teng, T'ao." He put forward the slogan "Down with Liu, Teng, Ch'en." How can you as a cadre at the head of department level [Yao may have become deputy head of the General Service Department of the Foreign Ministry upon his return from Indonesia] put forward such a slogan? Who gave you permission? As for sending telegrams to embassies, no one understood this. You [rebels] always want to do everything in such an absolute fashion.<sup>88</sup>

---

<sup>88</sup> Hung-wei-pao, September 15, 1967, in China Topics, op. cit., Document 8/a.

Chou's testimony may offer additional support for the hypothesis advanced earlier that the promotion of the Cultural Revolution abroad was probably the handiwork of certain ideological fanatics in Chinese embassies. If Yao Teng-shan indeed "seized power" -- or, perhaps more accurately, wreaked havoc while the Central Committee was too preoccupied with other matters to intervene -- it was well after trouble had begun in Rangoon, Colombo, Pnom Penh, and Kathmandu. His short-lived tenure as foreign minister may have given added encouragement to ultraleftists overseas; but whether his telegrams and other hijinks caused real damage is debatable.

At the same time as the ultraleftists were apparently running roughshod over the Foreign Ministry, they kept up their personal barrage against the Foreign Minister by persisting in their demands that Ch'en Yi make a second formal self-criticism. A Japanese correspondent reported that on August 6 members of one rebel faction received assurances from Hsieh Fu-chih and Chou that "struggle rallies" could and would be held on August 7 and 11.<sup>89</sup> The rally of August 7 may not have been held, but it is known that on August 11 about 10,000 "rebels" gathered at the Great Hall of the People in Peking to criticize the Foreign Minister. Chou En-lai, who was at the meeting, is said to have told the assemblage that he

---

<sup>89</sup>Tokyo Shimbun, August 7, 1967. Other reports from correspondents in Peking at this time, however, noted on the basis of wall posters that in fact Ch'en Yi had been favorably passed on by the Central Committee and, in essence, accepted as one of the party's hierarchy.

supported medium-sized and small rallies against Ch'en and would attend others if held. As for Ch'en, he was apparently subjected to another humiliating barrage of charges revolving about his support of the Liu-Teng line; he is also alleged to have made a self-criticism, although details were not made public.<sup>90</sup>

Extremist attacks on Ch'en Yi took up again later in August at a second mass rally on the twenty-seventh. Dubbed the "Thoroughly Criticize Ch'en Yi Rally," assertedly by Premier Chou, it was conducted by Ch'en Po-ta and Vice-Premier Li Fu-ch'un. According to a wall poster that described the event, the Red Guards greatly appreciated the leadership's interest in and encouragement of "exposing and criticizing" Ch'en's policies.<sup>91</sup> Yet the same

---

<sup>90</sup>Yomiuri Shimbun, Tokyo, August 14, 1967. In a speech of March 6, 1968, Ch'en mentioned that between August and September 1967, seven different criticism meetings of varying size were held, and that at the larger ones certain people (presumably including Yao Teng-shan) sought to "make me a springboard for their personal aims." I-yüeh feng-pao, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>91</sup>Specifically, the rally took issue with Ch'en's alleged sympathy with Liu Shao-ch'i's supposed foreign policy line of san-hsiang i-mieh (three surrenders, one extinction): surrendering to U.S. imperialism, Soviet modern revisionism and reactionaries, and extinguishing the flames of revolutionary warfare throughout the world. Ch'en is said to have made various "capitulationist" statements over the years -- e.g., saying in 1963 that the United States may withdraw from Vietnam, but adding in 1964 that in any case the United States will not arbitrarily expand the war to China -- but the "evidence" cited reveals not "capitulationism" but a rather level-headed perception of the United States. Of course, Ch'en, like Liu Shao-ch'i and others attacked during the Cultural Revolution, had to suffer through the typical distortions that accompany purges and attempted purges.



source also revealed that the leadership was still only willing to countenance criticism of Ch'en Yi to a point. Li Fu'ch'un was quoted as having complimented the rebels on their criticism. "But," he cautioned, "as for the slogan shouted by some of you, 'Down with Ch'en Yi,' I now still cannot accept it."<sup>92</sup> Evidently, in August no less than previously, leading members of the Central Committee, who we may assume had been following Mao's instructions, were staunchly opposed to terminating Ch'en's career. Yet they appeared equally reluctant to put an end to the confrontation.

Until the tail end of August, while the Central Committee was either divided over or simply unwilling to stop the extremists from occupying the Foreign Ministry, Ch'en Yi functioned as virtually a lame duck minister. Although he continued to attend and host official functions, he had clearly lost what limited influence he may have had over foreign relations in the preceding few months.

The deterioration of Sino-Cambodian relations at this juncture best illustrates the erosion of relatively moderate influence over the conduct of foreign affairs. On August 15, Prince Phurissara arrived in Peking and subsequently met with Ch'ien and Chou. According to Sihanouk, "Chou En-lai requested . . . Phurissara to ask me to accord the Chinese residents in Cambodia the right to love Chairman Mao Tse-tung, to love Chinese communism, the CPR." This request "surprised" Sihanouk, for it ran contrary to

---

<sup>92</sup> Pei-wai hung-ch'i (Foreign Language Institute Red Flag), Peking, undated, in China Topics, op. cit., Document 7.

Chou's previous attitude and amounted to "authoriz[ing] our Chinese friends to commit subversion among the Khmers. . . ." Sihanouk responded very negatively to Chou's inquiry,<sup>93</sup> but Phurissara, before departing, apparently received new assurances from Chou and Ch'en of China's continued adherence to the principle of noninterference in Cambodian affairs.

On September 1, however, support of subversive activities by the Chinese Embassy had so increased that Sihanouk felt compelled to abolish all friendship associations, the aim being to dissolve the troublesome Khmer-Chinese Friendship Association (KCFA). He also ordered the dissolution of all press associations and warned journalists against serving "foreign ideologies." At a moment of great excitement over the Cultural Revolution, Sihanouk's moves may have been interpreted as flagrant abuses of Peking's friendship. On September 4, the Peking branch of the association cabled the defunct KCFA to struggle against "the reactionaries." Sihanouk considered the cable "an extraordinary interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state" and, on September 13, announced that all Cambodian embassy personnel in Peking would be returning home. Sihanouk was only persuaded to keep his embassy personnel in Peking by the personal intervention of Chou, who had earned the Prince's friendship and respect as the result of several

---

<sup>93</sup>Speech of September 12, 1967, in Les Paroles de Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk, 1967, Ministry of Information, Phnom Penh, 1968, p. 695.

official visits exchanged over the years.<sup>94</sup> Chou may have been able to prevail upon Mao and the Central Committee by arguing that the benefits of Cambodia's friendship (including Phnom Penh's anti-American posture over Vietnam) outweighed any advantages Peking might derive from pressing ahead with the confrontation.

Yet, in dealing with Mao, Chou's persuasive powers may not have been as decisive as the practical consideration that extremist influence in the Foreign Ministry and in the foreign service was doing irreparable harm to China's image abroad. This perception may in turn have stemmed not so much from any one instance of adverse reaction abroad to the overflow of the Cultural Revolution as from the more visible effects of the outrage perpetrated by fanatical Red Guards on the British mission in Peking. The mission, it will be recalled, had first been besieged (by non-Chinese zealots) on June 9; but on August 22, Red Guards set fire to the U.K. mission and completely gutted it. The British chargé d'affaires and several of his staff were reportedly beaten when they rushed out of the building. An unidentified escapee from the mainland subsequently related in Hong Kong that these acts were conceived by Yao Teng-shan, not the Peking leadership, and were responsible for his being labeled soon after as a man of mad personal ambitions.<sup>95</sup> An equally plausible explanation is that the

---

<sup>94</sup>For documentation and Sihanouk's interpretation of these events, see *ibid.*, pp. 649-656, 675-680, 694-696, 707, 711-715, and 754-755. See also R. M. Smith, "Cambodia: Between Scylla and Charybdis," Asian Survey, Vol. III, No. 1, January 1968, pp. 75-76.

<sup>95</sup>Hsing-tao jih-pao, Hong Kong, October 23, 1967, p. 1.

regime, having warned Great Britain (as it had warned Burma) of "serious consequences" in the event of its failure to comply with the terms of an August 20 ultimatum on the Hong Kong situation,<sup>96</sup> used the Red Guards to carry out the threat, only to have them go beyond all reasonable bounds by gutting the chancery. In either case, the primary point is that unleashed fanaticism had placed the CPR in an extremely uncomfortable position, one that Mao may finally have become convinced was intolerable.

---

<sup>96</sup>The Chinese ultimatum demanded that the United Kingdom cancel a ban on three local pro-communist newspapers and gave the Hong Kong authorities forty-eight hours to drop lawsuits against arrested newspapermen.

## V. THE RETURN OF MODERATION

The sacking of the British chancery was only the most blatant sign of the total disorder that the Peking leadership's toleration of extremist behavior had facilitated. The violence of the Red Guards on August 22, 1967 apparently had many parallels in the Chinese provinces as factionalism and conflict became more rampant in the competition to "seize power" and demonstrate loyalty to the thoughts of Mao. Whether the regime recognized that extremist tactics were faulty or simply decided to inaugurate a new revolutionary stage now that violence had served its purpose, the leadership demanded consolidation of the left and condemned any resort to armed struggle.

### ORDER RETURNS TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

The first indication of the new line came soon after the events of August 22. Chou En-lai is reported to have issued instructions restricting Red Guard activities around the foreign missions in Peking. The rebels were specifically enjoined from "beating, smashing, burning, invading, and obstructing" in their demonstrations.<sup>97</sup> Then, on September 1, an important resolution was published by the Peking municipal party committee which emphasized that "politics" (criticism, self-criticism, and rectification) rather than armed struggle should be the chief means of attacking "capitalist roaders." While praising the contributions of the "proletarian revolutionaries" and the PLA, the Peking party committee ordered a cessation of "struggles by

---

<sup>97</sup> Asahi Evening News, Tokyo, September 5, 1967.

force" and demanded that "the great criticism and repudiation [be carried out] in a planned and organized manner. . . ." Red Guards were forbidden to roam about the countryside; instead, they were to keep to their original units and to reach agreement with other revolutionary groups to support the army.<sup>98</sup>

The Peking committee's resolution presaged a directive with nationwide applicability on September 5 in the form of a speech by Chiang Ch'ing. Although Chiang Ch'ing had evidently been one of the chief supporters of the "seize power" movement, in this speech she came out four-square against armed struggle and factionalism, and sharply criticized Red Guard attacks on the PLA to acquire guns. She pointed out that military goods slated for Vietnam had been seized, and she declared that attacks on foreign embassies must cease.<sup>99</sup> Her criticism of Red Guard seizures of arms was given official sanction the same day when a combined order of the Central Committee, the State Council, the Military Affairs Committee, and the Cultural Revolution Group expressly forbade the "seizure of arms, equipment, and other military supplies from the PLA" and gave the PLA the right to return fire if attacked.<sup>100</sup>

The effect of these developments on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was threefold: they led to the removal

---

<sup>98</sup>The resolution also condemned the "May 16 Corps," one of the leading extremist groups, as "counterrevolutionary," perhaps a warning to other ultraleft organizations that the regime's support could be withdrawn as easily as it had been tendered. NCNA (Peking) broadcast of September 10, 1967.

<sup>99</sup>SCM, No. 4069, November 29, 1967, pp. 1-9.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid., No. 4026, September 22, 1967, pp. 1-2.

of Ch'en Yi's key opponents; they brought about renewed expressions of confidence in and support of Ch'en Yi by the leadership; they precluded further attempts by embassies abroad to "make revolution" and thus signaled the start of a slow return of normalcy in China's foreign relations.

Yao Teng-shan was not heard from again after the August 22 Red Guard assault on the British chancery. Wang Li's future also appears problematical. Precisely how the regime chose to deal with them as part of its effort to reestablish order and impose restraints on the ultraleft is still unknown, but beginning in September both Yao and Wang were almost certainly removed from authoritative positions.

Coincidentally, Ch'en received indirect and direct support from the Cultural Revolution Group. In a speech on September 1, K'ang Sheng reportedly told an expanded meeting of the Peking Revolutionary Committee that it was important to separate the issue of Ch'en's alleged errors from the government's foreign policy line. K'ang held that the "three surrenders, one extinction" charge was mistaken, since it is the Central Committee that lays down foreign policy guidelines. The Foreign Ministry, he was saying, could hardly be attacked for selling out the country when the Central Committee had all along been responsible for policies that were ipso nature correct. K'ang specifically forbade seizing power in foreign affairs and the Foreign Ministry; but his statement might be further interpreted as indirectly refuting certain charges made against the "revisionist" foreign policy line of Liu .

Shao-ch'i as well as absolving Ch'en Yi of responsibility for any foreign policies.<sup>101</sup>

K'ang Sheng's defense of the Foreign Ministry did not keep two of the more fanatic Red Guard newspapers from teaming up in September to sustain their verbal assault on the Foreign Minister, this time charging that Ch'en Yi stood by over the years while the Ne Win government was systematically restricting the power and privileges of the local Chinese in Burma.<sup>102</sup> Again, however, it appears that the Peking leadership was prepared to intervene, perhaps more forcefully than before, in Ch'en's defense. According to a Nationalist Chinese source, Mao, in late October, instructed that Ch'en receive full support and that the elimination of Yao and Wang (presumably meaning their influence and followers) be treated as a priority matter.<sup>103</sup>

---

<sup>101</sup>K'ang did not exclude the possibility of criticizing Ch'en ("If Ch'en Yi has [committed] errors, he can make a self-examination"); but the tone of his statement suggests that he was defending the Foreign Minister no less than the Ministry from a repetition of the events that had led to the disruption in August. Hung-wei-pao, September 15, 1967, in China Topics, op. cit., Document 8/b.

<sup>102</sup>Wai-shih hung-ch'i and Ke-ming ch'iao-pao, September 12, 1967 (joint issue), in *ibid.*, Document 9.

<sup>103</sup>Chinese Communist Affairs: Facts and Features, Vol. I, No. 3, November 29, 1967, pp. 24-25. In the instruction, Mao assertedly declared: "All foreign affairs units should be merged into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the minister of which is Ch'en Yi. If Ch'en is not the minister, who is the minister?" Insisting that "Foreign policy is formulated by me and implemented by Premier Chou," Mao directly attacked Wang Li, Kuan Feng (another former



The extremists had, however, managed to take a heavy toll on the then sixty-seven year old Ch'en Yi's health before being quelled,<sup>104</sup> and it was apparently for this reason that, following the banquet given for Prince Phourissara on August 18, Ch'en did not participate in an official function for a month and a half. The Foreign Minister's next appearance was at the National Day celebration on October 1. His first reported official act after the August turmoil was not until November 8 when he attended the signing of the 1968 Sino-Ceylonese Trade and Payments Agreement and Barter Protocol.

Meanwhile, almost every Chinese Embassy was still without an ambassador as 1967 ended. Whereas forty of forty-six Chinese ambassadors were present at their embassy's traditional National Day reception in 1966, only one (Huang Hua, ambassador to the UAR) hosted the festivities on October 1, 1967.<sup>105</sup> The chief difference

---

member of the Cultural Revolution Group), and Yao Teng-shan for having gone beyond acceptable bounds in their opposition to Ch'en. "Now whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can strike down Wang Li and Yao Teng-shan or not is a question of revolution or no revolution." Mao also said: "Wang Li was a bad fellow from the beginning. Chiang Ch'ing long ago talked to me about the problem of Wang Li and Kuan Feng."

<sup>104</sup>A Red Guard newspaper of November 26 quotes Mao as having said of his Foreign Minister: "How can Ch'en be struck down? He has been with us 40 years and has so many achievements. He has lost 27 lb. weight. I cannot show him to foreign guests in this condition." In Asian Analyst, March 1968, p. 9.

<sup>105</sup>Daniel Tretiak, "Disappearing Act," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 8, 1968, p. 216.

in the Chinese foreign service before and after the several months of Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry seems to have been that, after August, the embassies were not free to carry the Revolution over into foreign capitals. But reeducation of erring ambassadors probably continued well after August 1967; only a handful of them have reappeared in public as a sign of their rehabilitation.

The locale of National Day receptions given by Chinese missions on October 1, 1967 provided the first clue to Peking's interest in restoring harmony in its relations with certain countries that had been directly affected by the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Peking had gone too far to suddenly reverse course in its relations with Burma; and its differences with New Delhi, Djakarta, and the British in Hong Kong, transcending questions of interference by the Chinese missions, persisted into 1968. But the receptions held by Chinese officials in Nepal, Ceylon, and Cambodia did seem to signify a recognition on Mao's part that the hostility of these governments toward China needed to be ameliorated gradually, though without giving the appearance of a humiliating CPR retreat. More concretely, in November 1967, the previously mentioned economic agreements were signed with Ceylon; during the first half of 1968, Nepalese dignitaries renewed their pilgrimages to Peking; and Chinese statements were published on several occasions offering sustained backing for Cambodia's struggle against "U.S. imperialism."

There were also indications during 1968 that Peking, despite the vociferous verbal support given local communists in Hong Kong and the Communist Party of Burma, was

equally capable of downgrading that support for the sake of larger Chinese interests, even at the expense of eventually embarrassing the very forces Peking had previously encouraged. In Hong Kong, beginning in September 1967, local communists found Peking very gradually disengaging from statements that might imply a direct commitment to their struggle against the British authorities. Then, on July 30, 1968, Peking granted exit visas to several U.K. diplomatic personnel previously refused permission to return home. The action may have been tied to the release of some imprisoned communist agitators in Hong Kong.

Toward Burma, Peking continued its accusations that the Burmese Government was denying overseas Chinese their legitimate rights. But over the months the tone of CPR statements changed subtly, so that one year after the incidents of June-July 1967, the Ne Win government was no longer being condemned as violently as before. Moreover, there were several substantive signs of a change in Peking's attitude. These included a donation of 10,000 yuan by the Chinese Red Cross to the Burmese Red Cross to assist in the relief of hurricane victims (May 1968); participation of the Chinese chargé in the July 19 Martyrs' Day ceremony honoring Aung San, the hero of Burma's independence; and a reception held by the Chinese military attaché in Rangoon (and attended by Burmese officials) commemorating the founding of the Chinese Army (August 1).<sup>106</sup>

---

<sup>106</sup> NCNA (Peking) broadcast of May 30, 1968; Yomiuri Shimbun, October 26, 1968; NCNA (Peking) broadcast of August 5, 1968.

Finally, in a most unusual development, NCNA reported that the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon had held a National Day reception that was attended by unspecified Burmese officials -- in contrast to receptions held in Peking attended only by members of the CPB hierarchy. Quite conceivably, Peking over time will move further toward the GUB and further away from the CPB, gradually returning to the pre-Cultural Revolution policy of avowing respect for Burmese neutralism without expressly disavowing the Burmese communist movement. Judging from Ne Win's statements since the summer of 1967, this is also his expectation of the future direction of Peking's policy -- and his refusal to move closer to the United States or the Soviet Union underscores his reliance on firmness and patience.

#### THE LAST ACT: CH'EN YI'S SELF-DEFENSE

The drama of the oscillating fortunes of China's Foreign Ministry and its Foreign Minister during the Cultural Revolution was not completely played out with the onset of a period of consolidation in the fall of 1967. For reasons not entirely clear, Ch'en's supporters in the Ministry felt compelled to make a public defense of their chief in early 1968. Upon an unfavorable response to it by Chou En-lai, Ch'en Yi disavowed the defense and subsequently delivered a speech that came close to being, and was possibly intended as, a self-criticism. These final scenes apparently ended the play; in the process, Ch'en Yi had managed not only to preserve his position, but also to defend himself against many of the wild charges made in attacking him.

In an extraordinary move, on February 13, 1968, 91 people, heads of department in the Ministry and ambassadors, put their names to a wall poster<sup>107</sup> that lashed out at the ultraleftists, defended the loyalty of the ministry's cadres, and sought to deflate the more serious accusations leveled against Ch'en Yi. Recounting how the extremists had tried to get rid of Ch'en Yi and his associates, the poster charged that the extremists had resorted to distortions, exaggerations, outright lies, and slanders. These occurred, it went on, because certain people thought that by feigning extreme leftism they could conceal that they themselves were "class enemies." Despite the protection of Ch'en Yi by Mao, Chiang Ch'ing, Ch'en Po-ta, and Chou, the ultraleft had carried on the attack. Of course, the poster contended, all this was not to say that Ch'en Yi was without error; but Ch'en had been criticized excessively, others in the Ministry who committed mistakes had already been criticized for them, and facts have shown that "the majority of the personnel in our ministry are good and comparatively good comrades, that they basically want to make revolution and ardently love Chairman Mao." Yet considerable damage had been done as a result of the ultraleft's attacks, the authors maintained. The prestige of the "proletarian headquarters"

---

<sup>107</sup> Since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs then had 15 heads of department (szu-chang), the vast majority of the signers were obviously ambassadors.

The poster, entitled "Expose the Enemy, Fight and Overcome Him: In Criticism of the Reactionary Slogan, 'Criticize Ch'en Yi,'" was published in I-yüeh feng-pao, May 1968, p. 3.

and of Mao himself had been shaken and harmed; and the power of the Ministry had been usurped.

A reasonable conclusion from the circumstance of the wall poster's appearance is that the ultraleft had not entirely desisted from assailing Ch'en Yi. That the heads of department and ambassadors waited until February 1968 to counterattack publicly would further suggest that only then did they feel sufficiently secure to air their grievances after a lengthy silence. Not until early 1968, perhaps, did they regard the discipline being imposed on the Cultural Revolution as a firm assurance against a renewal of extremist fervor -- firm enough, that is, to risk publicly identifying with the Foreign Minister in the belief that he did in fact have the backing of the Cultural Revolution Group and the Central Committee.

Whatever the case, though, use of the wall poster turned out to be a tactical misjudgment. No sooner did it appear than Chou En-lai (as reported in a prefatory note by the editor of January Storm, which published the poster) directed: "This big-character poster is mistaken in principle; it is an interference from the right." Evidently, Chou (perhaps acting on instructions from Mao) considered the poster ill-timed. To make a public airing of the dispute over the Ministry might have been deemed purposeless and a potential incitement to renewed controversy, as Ch'en Yi himself was about to remark.

Later Red Guard material relates that Chou not only condemned the poster, he also demanded that Ch'en disavow it, warning that "Comrade Ch'en Yi and the Party committee of the ministry should declare their attitude, or I'll have to declare mine." Placed with his back to the wall,

Ch'en responded with a carefully worded letter to Chou on February 28. His letter reads in part:

I now solemnly declare that I completely support your directive. The 91-man big-character poster is rightist and conservative in its spirit and stand. It opposes the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and gives vent to grievances against the criticism and repudiation by the revolutionary masses. This big-character poster can do nothing whatever to help me correct my mistakes, but instead may encourage antagonism between its authors and the masses [emphasis supplied]. I absolutely do not agree with this erroneous spirit and stand.<sup>108</sup>

Ch'en went on to admit to having failed to "put politics in command." One major error was that he didn't "reform my capitalist class world outlook"; but the criticism of cadres and the revolutionary masses in 1967 helped "destroy this harmful vermin of bourgeois world outlook." In revealing this and other "major mistakes," Ch'en drew a distinction between "the small number of bad men" who shout "Down with Ch'en Yi" to achieve "their personal ends" and the majority, who are genuinely concerned with correcting his errors. The wall poster of the ninety-one failed to make the distinction, Ch'en implied, for its signers "have not really been educated in the great cultural education."

Ch'en's repudiation of the wall poster and admission of guilt did not end with the letter. Either because of

---

<sup>108</sup>The letter, along with Chou's warning, is contained in Chung-ta hung-ch'i (Chung-shan University Red Flag), April 4, 1968, p. 2 (published by the Canton Congress of Red Representatives), and Kuang-chou hung-ta-hui (Canton Red Congress), April 3, 1968.

renewed pressure from the far left or because the Central Committee found it necessary on other grounds, a "Foreign Ministry United Preparatory Investigation Meeting" was held on March 6 at which the Foreign Minister again spoke about his past "crimes." In brief, Ch'en was reported to have said that he committed the error of protecting old cadres while blaming younger ones for being overly leftist, with the result that "bad" and "capitalist" persons were retained at their posts.<sup>109</sup> The words he uttered in repudiating his first confession in February 1967 were "crazy talk" designed to protect old cadres when in fact it was important that revolution be carried out to "save" both them and himself from further error. Thus, another mistake was to have opposed the notion of seizing power, to have feared chaos and upheaval. The poster of the ninety-one again came under attack, Ch'en Yi at one point calling it "unforgiveable." Yet, in looking back to the events of the previous year, Ch'en also condemned those people who were primarily interested in satisfying their personal ambitions rather than in correcting his errors.<sup>110</sup>

What is notable about Ch'en's letter to Chou and his follow-up speech to the "investigation meeting" is not so much the fact of his having confessed anew to previous

---

<sup>109</sup> Ch'en went on to say, in a strange conclusion on this point, that because such persons remained at their posts, "an extremely serious question [arose] which became more and more serious, opposing fighting people's wars. [This was] an extreme rightist tendency; there was no precedent for it, and what history lacked, I opposed." Ch'en offered no other words of explanation.

<sup>110</sup> Text of the speech is in I-yüeh feng-pao, May 1968, op. cit., p. 2.



errors as his having cleverly turned an adverse situation to some advantage. In the first place, he used what probably was intended as opportunities to placate the ultra-left into opportunities to denigrate the radicals while professing loyalty to the "mass line." Thus, although Ch'en repudiated the poster of the ninety-one and acknowledged his imperfections, his distinction between the helpful criticisms of the proletarian majority and the destructive personal assaults of the minority made apparent his revulsion for the tactics of the ultraleft.<sup>111</sup> He had indirectly underscored his belief that errors can hardly be corrected by extremists, who in any case represent a minority. Second, Ch'en consistently referred to errors committed in the past year only; he neither admitted to having been unfaithful to Mao before the Cultural Revolution (as some Red Guard groups had averred) nor considered himself in error at the time he was speaking. Moreover, those errors he did acknowledge were errors of class attitude, not the more serious errors of policy "line" and "direction." Finally, Ch'en could not avoid disavowing the wall poster put up in his defense; but in criticizing it and criticizing himself for having kept "capitalist" and "bad" cadres in office, Ch'en made no verbal commitment to rid the Foreign Ministry of his long-time supporters -- and indeed, it appears that some of the

---

<sup>111</sup> In his letter to Chou, Ch'en wrote: "The minority of bad people have already been exposed by the masses and moreover are continuing to be exposed; this is a good thing. . . ."

criticized vice-ministers have returned to their posts.<sup>112</sup> What might have been intended as sops to the ultraleft, in summary, seem to have cut two ways, for if the extremists who demanded that Ch'en be criticized were appeased, Ch'en had also used considerable finesse in making a case in his own defense. The last act of the drama therefore closed much as it had begun: Ch'en Yi had apparently artfully exploited a tactical retreat to preserve his position and dignity while seeming to pacify his opponents.

---

<sup>112</sup>Of the ten vice-ministers, it appears that in toto five were criticized, of whom one was purged (Chang Han-fu), and at least two were restored to their posts; the fate of the remainder is still unclear. Four vice-ministers do not appear to have been affected by the Cultural Revolution (Lo Kuei-po, Han Nien-lung, Hsü I-hsin, and Ch'en Chia-k'ang).

The author is indebted to Donald Klein of Columbia University for information on the vice-ministers.

## VI. AN ASSESSMENT

In this concluding assessment of the Cultural Revolution's impact on the Foreign Ministry and foreign affairs, the discussion will center on three areas: first, the motivations behind the ultraleftist attacks on the ministry at the various stages of the Cultural Revolution; second, the reasons why Ch'en Yi was able to survive the struggle; third, the implications of the Cultural Revolution for Communist China's foreign relations and foreign policy.

### THE "ISSUES" IN THE CONFRONTATION

Far from having been a contest between party and anti-party elements or competing substantive policy views, it seems fairly clear that the lines of battle formed around Ch'en Yi and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because of the Foreign Minister's adamant refusal to permit the "revolutionary left" organizations to establish themselves in any of the agencies and bureaus concerned with the implementation of foreign policy. Ch'en evidently regarded the prospect of having youthful zealots serve as watchdogs within the foreign affairs system as a threat to his personal authority, to the positions of experienced foreign affairs personnel, and to the proper functioning of the bureaucracy.

In what was perhaps a tactical error, Ch'en early revealed his position by sending work teams to defend points under attack, thus aligning himself with the ill-fated Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. After the August

plenum decision, Ch'en's position as an opponent of thoroughgoing revolution was exposed as Red Guards apparently received Mao's authorization to criticize Ch'en and cleanse the Ministry of "counterrevolutionary" influence. The ensuing months of confrontation typified the overall character of the Cultural Revolution: the struggle between those bent on purging supposedly ultra-conservative institutions and those determined to resist encroachments on their bailiwicks.

The confrontation sparked by the work teams was only the first of what may be seen as three stages in the struggle between the Ministry and the extremist factions. The second stage began in August 1966 (after the decision of the Central Committee plenum) and ended with Ch'en Yi's "confession" in January 1967. The third, commencing with renewed Red Guard violence in late March, did not end until early September, when the Peking leadership determined to "consolidate" the Revolution at the height of the nearly uncontrollable agitation. Significant in the timing of these stages is that they developed approximately in synchrony with the ebb and flow of the ultra-leftists' fortunes in the Cultural Revolution at large. When "power seizures" were in vogue across the mainland, the revolutionary left moved against the Foreign Ministry; but when the regime felt compelled to rein in the left, pressure on the Ministry was dramatically reduced. The Foreign Minister, as in early February when he retracted his confession, was able to counterattack.

This oscillation of events helps clarify the nature of the struggle we have been describing. After the first

two stages of the confrontation, the revolutionary left had been frustrated not only by the adamancy of Ch'en Yi, but equally by the leadership's evident determination to protect him from being overthrown and the bureaucracy from having to share administrative power. The manner in which the ultraleft began the third round -- penetrating the Ministry, upsetting files, disrupting work, and raising new charges of Ch'en's collusion with the "reactionary" line of Liu and Teng -- betokened a certain desperation at having been obstructed front and rear. In particular, the flimsiness of the indictments of Ch'en's views -- that he was instrumental in suppressing the revolutionary potential of the overseas Chinese, that he sympathized with and actively lobbied for Liu's supposed "three surrenders, one extinction," and that he had long been opposed to "the thoughts of Mao"<sup>113</sup> -- suggests that the ultraleft's chief bone of contention in the dispute with Ch'en had all along been his firm hostility to carrying the Cultural Revolution into foreign affairs circles. Only by the most arduous talmudology could those statements of Ch'en's cited by the Red Guard groups be considered blasphemous.

The Foreign Minister's defenders in the Ministry and the foreign service were hence probably correct in their essential claim that the opposition to Ch'en consisted of a central core of fanatics who, through deception and

---

<sup>113</sup>The most complete listing of Ch'en's "crimes" may be found in "One Hundred Examples of Speeches by Ch'en Yi Opposing Mao Tse-tung's Thought: Highest Directive," Tung-fang-hung chan-pao (East-is-Red Combat Newspaper), Peking, June 15, 1967, written by the Criticize Ch'en Liaison Station.

distortion, whipped up a whirlwind into which a larger number of rebels without a cause were drawn.<sup>114</sup> Whether or not Yao Teng-shan and, behind him, Wang Li, were at the core of the ultraleft resurgence in the spring of 1967, the point remains that the struggle over the Foreign Ministry was consistently a tug-of-war between intransigent forces of the extreme left and equally intransigent forces of the center-left.

#### WHY CH'EN YI SURVIVED

The frustration the Red Guards doubtless experienced in trying to oust Ch'en Yi and several of his vice-ministers was in large measure attributable to Chou En-lai. Throughout the ordeal, Chou appeared sympathetic to holding criticism meetings against Ch'en, but Chou carefully insulated his Foreign Minister and long-time comrade<sup>115</sup> from the more radical demands of the ultraleft. Undoubtedly

---

<sup>114</sup>From the letter of the ninety-one, in I-yüeh feng-pao, op. cit., May 1968.

<sup>115</sup>The personal relationship of Chou and Ch'en dates back to the post-World War I period when both were students in France. Ch'en joined the Communist Youth League there which Chou helped establish. Little is known about their relations during the early years of the CCP, the Yen-an period, or the war years. Since 1954, Ch'en has been a vice-premier under Chou; and he succeeded Chou as foreign minister in 1958. Ch'en has frequently accompanied Chou on official state visits and as part of CPR delegations to important conferences (e.g., to Bandung in 1955).

with the support of Mao,<sup>116</sup> however ambiguous and unemphatic it seemed at times, Chou spoke for the moderates in the Central Committee who found it necessary to appease the revolutionary left, but not at the expense of turning the Foreign Ministry upside down. This basic policy, which was also enunciated by Ch'en Po-ta and K'ang Sheng, seems to have been primarily responsible for having kept Ch'en Yi afloat.

The Central Committee's backing of criticism of Ch'en evidently did not satisfy the Red Guards but may have served the purposes intended by Mao. The extremists were clearly not content merely to criticize, and their inclination to defy all authority brought about their own fall from grace. But their prolonged assaults on the position and person of Ch'en probably did succeed in eroding his authority and prestige,<sup>117</sup> and conceivably in damaging

---

<sup>116</sup>In view of the limited Party Central Committee representation at the highest levels of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ch'en Yi is a full member; Chang Han-fu and Lo Kuei-po were alternate members), it is possible that Mao wished to keep Ch'en Yi at his post not only to maintain in office a long-time bureaucrat who commanded the loyalty of experienced subordinates, but also to assure that the Central Committee's views would continue to be adequately represented in the ministry. "Indeed," Donald Klein has pointed out, "Ch'en Yi may have been selected to succeed Chou En-lai [as foreign minister] (February 1958) in order to serve as the continuing voice of the Central Committee -- and more particularly the Politburo -- within the M.F.A." ("Peking's Evolving Ministry of Foreign Affairs," The China Quarterly, No. 4, October-December 1960, p. 30.) This consideration may have been equally valid in 1966 and 1967.

<sup>117</sup>The best indication of this is that since the summer of 1967, Ch'en has been referred to in the Peking news media only as vice-premier.

his emotional stability. In view of Ch'en's early opposition to the Cultural Revolution movement in foreign affairs, Mao's constant aim may have been to assure that his "conservative" Foreign Minister's influence would be held in check.

#### A REVOLUTION IN FOREIGN POLICY?

In a very real sense, foreign affairs was in a state of suspended animation once the Cultural Revolution began. The attention of the leadership focused so exclusively on instituting the new mass line and purging undesirables that it is difficult to imagine foreign policy, in either its decision-making or implementation phases, as having been of much concern to the Central Committee. Foreign relations seem to have been restricted primarily to the reception of visiting delegations in Peking; the "output" function -- significant foreign policy statements, the dispatch of official delegations abroad, and the like -- was virtually closed off. With the nearly complete recall of ambassadors between late 1966 and the spring of 1967, moreover, Chinese embassies continued to function, but, it may be surmised, without the same degree of direction either on the spot or from Peking as before the Cultural Revolution. This mutually corrosive situation -- control of embassies in the hands of lesser officials and, apparently in a few cases (like Burma), Red Guard types, coupled with the Foreign Ministry's preoccupation with its own political survival -- at the very least enhanced the opportunities for fanatical elements abroad to "revolutionize" foreign affairs in much the same way as



the ultraleft was "revolutionizing" government and party offices on the mainland -- by vigorously propagating "the thoughts of Mao."

The actions of these extremists suggest several interesting hypotheses. First, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have lost control over certain embassies. Second, the brief "takeover" of the Ministry in August 1967 may have caused great havoc in the Ministry but may also have had negligible influence over the conflicts which by then had already unfolded between certain Chinese embassies and local governments. Finally, and most importantly, the sharp turns in Peking's relations with Burma, Ceylon, Cambodia, and Nepal may well have been dictated not by a conscious prior determination of Peking but by local Chinese representatives, who seem to have presented Mao with the unenviable choice of backing down before resistance to displays of loyalty or supporting the "just cause" of officials and overseas citizens of the People's Republic. Only in Burma, where the situation quickly reached a boiling point, was Peking unwilling to humble itself by ignoring what had happened.

The Cultural Revolution, then, clearly made its mark on China's foreign relations and may yet lead to a purge or drastic reshuffling in the Chinese foreign service. But the nature of the Revolution, as well as events since the fall of 1967, indicates no real revolution in foreign policy. The Cultural Revolution has been an internal phenomenon, and its seepage abroad to become a factor in China's relations with other countries seems to have been an uncalculated though perhaps inevitable by-product. As such, those instances in which the Revolution had deleterious

consequences for China's foreign relations might be characterized as aberrant episodes rather than as reflections of a persistent or prominent new strand in China's foreign policy line. That the overflow of the Revolution did not bring with it military adventures, and that since September 1967 the regime has gradually sought to stabilize its external relations, support this conclusion.

For those nations that experienced the overflow of the Cultural Revolution, however, this interpretation is likely to dim their suspicions of Chinese intentions. They are far more likely to keep up their guard against a repetition of the unhappy incidents of the summer of 1967. Those incidents, not the Chinese proclamations of continuing friendship and respect that ensued, are likely to be the real legacy of the Cultural Revolution, one that Peking in coming years will probably find difficult to dispell.

## DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY  THE RAND CORPORATION		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
		2b. GROUP
3. REPORT TITLE  THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN CHINA'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"		
4. AUTHOR(S) (Last name, first name, initial)  Gurtov, Melvin		
5. REPORT DATE  March 1969	6a. TOTAL No. OF PAGES	6b. No. OF REFS.
7. CONTRACT OR GRANT No.  F44620-67-C-0045	8. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT No.  RM-5934-PR	
9a. AVAILABILITY/LIMITATION NOTICES  DDC-1		9b. SPONSORING AGENCY United States Air Force Project RAND
10. ABSTRACT  An assessment of the impact of China's Cultural Revolution on her Ministry of Foreign Affairs, foreign relations, and foreign policy. In 1966-67, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs came under attack by Red Guard organizations determined to carry the Cultural Revolution into the foreign affairs system. Opposing the Mao-inspired radicals, Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi sent work teams into ministry-related institutions to protect them from harassment. This adamant resistance resulted in an investigation of Ch'en, a demand of public self-criticism, and the establishment of Red Guard liaison stations within the ministry to oversee its work. The Revolution's ebb and flow, however, enabled Ch'en to maintain his position as minister and to mediate between conservative and rebel elements. Reaching peak power in August 1967, the radicals rapidly lost favor, probably due to their disregard of authority and the fact that Mao's purpose--to hold the Foreign Minister's influence in check--had been achieved. Thus Ch'en emerged the victor, but at the price of weakened authority, prestige, and health. Although Peking's foreign relations have undoubtedly been undermined, the conflict does not seem to have concerned substantive issues and China's foreign policy has returned to a diplomacy of relative moderation.		11. KEY WORDS Far East Communism China International relations Foreign policy Policy analysis Government